Leve—Identity

Identity — Special Section: Keywords

by Lauren Leve

[Leve, Lauren. 2011. “Identity.” Current Anthropology 52 (4): 513–35.]

Abstract

“Identity” is a key term for anthropological analysis today. This paper explores the challenge posed by modernist Buddhists in Nepal who participated in identity politics while grounding their claims to identity-based rights in belonging to a religious community defined by the doctrine that there is no such thing as a “self” in the conventional sense. Examining the sharp proliferation of identity- based discourses and claims in post-1990 Nepal in light of broader structural transformations associated with the globalization of neoliberal governance strategies and against the rise of a popular vipassana meditation movement, I suggest that the rise of ethnoreligious politics in Nepal at that time reflects the presence of a global “identity machine”—an apparatus that establishes not only the categories of identity recognized and claimed in democratic states but also, indeed, their very ontological foundations in liberal conceptions of self, citizenship, and social relations. Nepali Buddhists who claim religious rights while also engaging in practices that challenge the very idea of identity are at once participating in the ideological and institutional conditions of neoliberal modernity and also reworking these in unexpected ways. This paradox calls on anthropologists to study the processes that produce and extend particular ways of seeing and organizing the world rather than inadvertently naturalizing them.

Points

“as the space between culture (as a taken-for-granted order of symbols, institutions, structures, values, and/or beliefs) and identity (as a reflexive construct or experiential modality through which one knows oneself and claims recognition) has seemed to shrink, identity has become, in effect, a kind of metaculture: culture—to use the old Hegelian terminology—not just in itself but for itself” (513-14).

“This paper addresses these concerns by asking not about the history or meaning of any particular collective identity but about the epistemological status of identity as an object in the world and of scholarly analysis. I argue that the proliferation of identity-based claims and politics that is so visible around the world today cannot be understood apart from a powerful sociopolitical formation that I refer to as an“identity machine”—a transnational assemblage that is rapidly reorganizing ways of being and knowing oneself and others in liberal and neoliberal democracies” (514).

“My concern here, however, is not the well-known fact that governance may take place through identity but what is specifically neoliberal about the ways this is occurring today. Materialized in the heavily promoted values, discourses, and institutions associated with neoliberal democracy and development, the identity machine produces not only the classes and categories of social personhood that structure public recognition of social collectivities but, indeed, the very ontology of “identity” itself” (514).

“My proposal is that these events reflect the power of a particular global sociopolitical imaginary, concretized in a constellation of institutions, ideologies, frameworks, structures, technologies, forms of knowledge, ethics, and norms that act as a kind of “identity machine,” producing not only the categories of ethnological identity (“ethnicities,” “tribes,”“nations,” “cultures”) but also the very ontology of identity that underlies liberal and neoliberal democracy.”

“we live in a time in which “culture” has become a powerful form of political currency, a morally and legally compelling aspect of personal and collective being that can be deployed as the basis of political claims. Arjun Appadurai (1996) has even given this a name, “culturalism”: “the conscious mobilization of cultural differences in the service of a larger national or transnational politics” (15)” (517).

“I propose that the current profusion of identity talk and also the political compulsion for states to recognize citizens’ sub- and supernational identities are at once parts and products of this global assemblage,which works by extending a particular style of thought and social organization in which identity proliferates and identities proliferate and in order to do certain kinds of politics, you have to represent yourself in certain terms and make your claims in certain ways” (518).

Doing is inherently plural, collective, choral, communal. This does not mean that all doing is (or indeed should be) undertaken collectively. It means rather that it is difficult to conceive of a doing that does not have the doing of others as a precondition. I sit at the computer and write this, apparently a lonely and individual act, but my writing is part of a social process, a plaiting of my writing with the writing of others (those mentioned in footnotes and a million others), and also with the doing of those who designed the computer, assembled it, packed it, transported it, and those who installed the electricity in the house, and those who generated the electricity, those who produced the food that gives me the energy to write, and so on. … Our doings are so intertwined that it is impossible to say where one ends and another begins. (Holloway 2002:26)” (523).

Identity machine

  • “Social groups are assumed to be constituted not primarily by their relations with one another but first and foremost by their relation with their own history. This history—“culture” in its material form—is assumed to make them what they are in the same way that an individual is assumed to be constituted, as an individual, by his or her own memory. This history/culture/identity is conceptualizedas something that these groups can—indeed, should—own and control. To destroy that property is murder; to appropriate it is theft. These are the assumptions that structured the Theravada Buddhist demand for secularism “as a human right” and for official constitutional recognition as Buddhist—not Hindu—citizens (see Leve 2007b)” (525).
  • the “vision of subjective personhood that I have been discussing in this paper—an ontology that has been globalized as part of political and economic liberalization in the shape of democratic policies, institutions, and norms. When people represent them selves as identity groups, they cast themselves as the owners of their identities and histories. The process is mediated through what can only be called an emerging global, neoliberal bureaucracy, which has now come to include national bureaucracies (along with NGOs, transnational corporations, and bodies such as the UN, IMF, and WTO) as different levels within its own administrative structure” (525).

Annotation Summary for: Leve – Identity

Page 2 (2), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Special Section: Keywords “Identity” by Lauren Leve”

Page 2 (2), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Identity is a powerful organizing presence in social life to- day—a social fact, or so it would, at least, seem.”

Page 2 (2), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the conviction that people have identities and that these are vital aspects of social personhood.”

Page 2 (2), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In part, this reflects the internationali- zation of democratic laws and institutions since the end of the Cold War, as also perhaps the increasing commodity value of cultural difference (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). It also suggests the presence of an increasingly global consensus on the nature of human beings.”

Page 2 (2), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “as the space between culture (as a taken-for-granted order of symbols, institutions, structures, values, and/or be- liefs) and identity (as a reflexive construct or experiential modality through which one knows oneself and claims rec- ognition) has seemed to shrink, identity has become, in effect,”

Page 2 (2), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “a kind of metaculture: culture—to use the old Hegelian ter- minology—not just in itself but for itself.”

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Yellow): Content: “metaculture:”

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “What, are anthropologists doing when we study “identity”?”

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “there is a question of analytical clarity:what happens when an analytical object—say, “culture” or“identity”—is also allowed to operate as an interpretive term,when a scholarly tool becomes its own subject?”

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Ihave been inspired by Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s(2001) caution “not to be seduced into treating the ideologicaltropes and surface forms of the culture of neoliberalism . . .as analytic constructs” (45). ”

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “This paper addresses these concerns by asking not aboutthe history or meaning of any particular collective identitybut about the epistemological status of identity as an objectin the world and of scholarly analysis.”

Page 3 (3), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I argue that the pro-liferation of identity-based claims and politics that is so visiblearound the world today cannot be understood apart from apowerful sociopolitical formation that I refer to as an“identitymachine”—a transnational assemblage that is rapidly reor-ganizing ways of being and knowing oneself and others inliberal and neoliberal democracies, ”

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Philosopher/cultural critic Anthony Ap- piah has declared this violence such that the “politics of rec- ognition equals the politics of compulsion” (Appiah 1992 in Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson 2001:18). Sociologist Paul Gil- roy (2000) argues that identity-based discourses are rooted in the same romantic historicismthat led to Europeanfascism.”

Page 3 (3), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “My concern here, however, is not the well-known fact that governance may take place through identity but what is spe- cifically neoliberal about the ways this is occurring today. Materialized in the heavily promoted values, discourses, and institutions associated with neoliberal democracy and devel- opment, the identity machine produces not only the classes and categories of social personhood that structure public rec- ognition of social collectivities but, indeed, the very ontology of “identity” itself.”

Page 3 (3), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 4 (4), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The Buddhist Paradox”

Page 4 (4), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “It is fair to say that 1990 was the year that “identity” became part of Nepal’s political landscape. That spring, a popular democracy movement (jana ando¯lan I) had compelled the king to abolish the Panchayat system, ending 28 years of palace-based, one-party rule and ushering in what was heralded as a new era of democratic freedom.”

Page 4 (4), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the same group of people who took to the streets todemand recognition did so in the name of a religion thatteaches that there is actually no such thing as a self! TheBuddhist doctrine of anatta-vada insists that “we”—thatwhich people everywhere in the world instinctively think ofas “our selves”—are merely the composite products of anunceasing flow of physical and mental sensations and events”

Page 4 (4), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “in the summer and fall of 1990, Theravada Buddhists were among the most active of the groups calling for ethnic and religious equality.”

Page 5 (5), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “that arise, take form, and eventually dissolve away again.3″

Page 5 (5), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” Aperson is nothing more than the aggregated effect of theseformations—as the Buddha famously put it, a “heap”—andthere is no substantive entity, no enduring, experiencing sub-ject that is ontologically distinguishable from these processesthemselves. In other words, Buddhismteaches, the experienceof a unified self and hence of personal identity is ultimatelyfalse. ”

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Globalizing Liberal Democracy: The Identity Machine”

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “My proposal is that these events reflect the power of a par-ticular global sociopolitical imaginary, concretized in a con-stellation of institutions, ideologies, frameworks, structures,technologies, forms of knowledge, ethics, and norms that actas a kind of “identity machine,” producing not only the cat-egories of ethnological identity (“ethnicities,” “tribes,”“nations,” “cultures”) but also the very ontology of identitythat underlies liberal and neoliberal democracy.”

Page 6 (6), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““identity machine,””

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “we live in a time in which “culture” has become a powerful form of political currency, a morally and legally compelling aspect of personal and collective being that can be deployed as the basis of political claims.”

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Arjun Appadurai (1996) has even given this a name, “culturalism”: “the con- scious mobilization of cultural differences in the service of a larger national or transnational politics” (15).9”

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““culturalism”:”

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “most often in- terpreted as a function of globalization and the intimate di- alectic of objectification and encounter brought about by postcolonial nationalism, late capitalism, majoritarian de- mocracy, and various other forces that have transformed re- lations between neighbors and within families and challenged the sovereignty of nation-states.”

Page 6 (6), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ““Put together these various in- gredients,” says John Comaroff (1996), “—a nation-state on the defensive and a rising cognizance (almost) everywhere of local cultural difference—and the product is a newly animated politics of identity” (174–175).”

Page 7 (7), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 7 (7), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I propose that the current profusion of identity talk and also the political compulsion for states to recognize citizens’ sub- and supernational iden- tities are at once parts and products of this global assemblage,which works by extending a particular style of thought andsocial organization in which identity proliferates andidentitiesproliferate and in order to do certain kinds of politics, youhave to represent yourself in certain terms and make yourclaims in certain ways.13”

Page 7 (7), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “By extending an identity-based model of political subjectivity, participation, and rights, the identity machine facilitates the globalization of neoliberal democracy.”

Page 7 (7), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ““Internationality””

Page 7 (7), Underline (Red): Content: ” Jonathan Re´e’s (1992)”

Page 7 (7), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Ac-cording to Re´e, nationalism is neither a natural social sen-timent nor an imagined political community but rather theeffect of a larger political and economic rationale that precedesthe formation of nation-states. He calls this “internationality”:a way of thinking and dividing up space “which tries to gen-erate a plurality of nations, in order that, for any piece ofland, and for any human being, there should be a definiteanswer to the question ‘which nation is responsible?’” (Re´e1992:10). ”

Page 7 (7), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““internationality”:”

Page 7 (7), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “anthropologists and others have cometo understand “an emerging systemof transnational governmentality” that is transforming the topography of po- litical authority and popular practice (Ferguson and Gupta 2002:990).12”

Page 8 (8), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Nations . . . are groups of people considered in relation to the local traditions and values which give them their “cul- tural identity,” but states are organizations which place themselves above society in order to monopolize the means of warfare and violence, and perhaps of welfare and culture too. . . . My argument is that the logic of internationality is deceptive because it attempts to confound and conceal the difference; it conspires to make us give our consent to state power by disguising it as an expression of our own feelings. (Re´e 1992:9)”

Page 8 (8), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “according to Re´e, internationality has repre- sented the interests of a historical ruling class as the essence of mankind for the past 300 years or more.”

Page 8 (8), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “two critical—and now institutional- ized—flaws in liberal political thought, John Locke’s (1813) Essay Concerning Human Un- derstanding.” The first, is the assumption that groups have “identities” in the same way that individuals do.”

Page 8 (8), Underline (Red): Content: “John Locke’s (1813) Essay Concerning Human Un- derstanding.””

Page 8 (8), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “As internationality produces nations and patriotic cit- izens, the identity machine creates an identitarian grammar that reshapes preexisting forms of sociality and/or fabricates new ones in accord with liberal and neoliberal forms of po- litical-economic rationality, among which lie the normative institutions of global democracy.14 It does this by offering incentives to organize one’s own and others’ “identities” in particular ways—most powerfully, the promise of recognition and support fromthe state, transnational civil society, or both.”

Page 8 (8), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Locke’s second mistake, according to Re´e, is his assertion that identities are simply a matter of memory.”

Page 9 (9), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Yet, the identity machine would have us believe that the ontological assumptions that order its system of social classifications re- flect the nature of the reality of identity itself.15”

Page 9 (9), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “possessive individualism transforms the logic of the labor market into a theory of self.16”

Page 9 (9), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Possession/Property/Personhood”

Page 9 (9), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “What, then, are these ontological assumptions? To answer thisquestion, I turn to C. B. Macpherson’s (1962) analysis of“possessive individualism” and its intellectual legacy. Simplyput, Macpherson’s insight is that liberal democratic thoughtis founded on a set of assumptions about human nature andsociety that naturalize behaviors and conditions associatedwith market capitalism. ”

Page 9 (9), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““possessive individualism””

Page 10 (10), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Late Capitalism and the Identitarian Impulse”

Page 10 (10), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Neoliberalism, it is generally agreed, refers to a set of po-litical and economic ideas that tie the liberal political com-mitment to maximal individual autonomy to a laissez-faireeconomic ideology. ”

Page 10 (10), Highlight (Yellow): Content: “Neoliberalism,”

Page 10 (10), Stamp (Exclamation Point (!, Red))

Page 10 (10), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “one effect of the much-debated shift in the structure of capitalism from industrial production to a ser- vice-based economy is the substitution of consumption for”

Page 10 (10), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Initially proposed by the political philos-opher Fredrich van Hayek after the Second World War anddeveloped by Hayek and others over the following decades,neoliberalism argues that governmental attempts to regulatemarkets constitute illegitimate infringements on individualliberty and property rights that interfere with economic ef-ficiency and reflect totalitarian tendencies. ”

Page 11 (11), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “production as the dominant means of identity formation. Inmany parts of the world, this transformation has been socomplete, in fact, that Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff(2001) can declare it “a truism . . . that postmodern personsare subjects made with objects” (4). The “culture” of latecapitalism, they write, “re-envisions persons not as producersfrom a particular community, but as consumers in a planetarymarketplace: persons as ensembles of identity that owe lessto history or society than to organically conceived humanqualities” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001:13).”

Page 11 (11), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the sub- and transnational identities that seem to pose such a challenge to nation-states at a time when London-based financiers press “enter” to move investment capital fromArgentina to India on behalf of Amer- ican-owned companies registered in the Cayman Islands are not, in fact, so different from nationalism in the way that they mobilize popular sentiment in support of a particular political order.”

Page 11 (11), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 11 (11), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ““Doing”: Identity as Process (and as Illusion)”

Page 11 (11), Underline (Red): Content: “Chantal Mouffe (2000).”

Page 11 (11), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “For Mouffe, identity politics— as also the recent ethical turn—signify not the success but the evisceration of meaningful democracy.”

Page 11 (11), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Neoliberal dis- courses and policies are exceedingly effective at eradicating political differences while intensifying social ones, she charges. But, when the agonistic dynamic of the pluralist system is hin- dered because of a lack of democratic identities with which people could identify, there is a risk that this will multiply confrontations over essentialist identities and non-negotia- ble moral values. (Mouffe 2000:92)”

Page 12 (12), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Holloway’s answer is that it is only by seeing objects asdiscrete, self-identical objects that anyone can claim to ownthem. Continuously transforming processes that connect ev-eryone in the world to everyone else are, after all, not easyto package for exchange. Thus, for Holloway, the logic ofproperty and the logic of identity are one and the same.”

Page 12 (12), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “It is the “separation of the doing from the done” that reduces infinite combinations of interwoven actions and the ever- evolving relations they create to things—static, contained, ap- parently autonomous objects.”

Page 12 (12), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “There may, however, be another way to look at this. One author I read while preparing this argument, for example, was the Scottish Marxist John Holloway. In Change the World without Taking Power, Holloway (2002) takes the ontological argument about the relation of identity and property about as far, perhaps, as it can possibly be taken. He begins by arguing that what philosophers, parliamentarians, and the rest of us perceive as things—discrete, self-identical objects—are, to the contrary, fluid and collective. When it is self-evident that the real world around us is in constant flux, what we consider “objects” are really processes, creating and contin- ually transformed by human activity, or “doing.” Moreover, he suggests, “doing” is not ever an isolated activity; it is in- herently social, comprising the interdependent labor of mul- tiple persons and communities: Doing is inherently plural, collective, choral, communal. This does not mean that all doing is (or indeed should be) undertaken collectively. It means rather that it is difficult to conceive of a doing that does not have the doing of others as a precondition. I sit at the computer and write this, apparently a lonely and individual act, but my writing is part of a social process, a plaiting of my writing with the writing of others (those mentioned in footnotes and a mil- lion others), and also with the doing of those who designed the computer, assembled it, packed it, transported it, and those who installed the electricity in the house, and those who generated the electricity, those who produced the food that gives me the energy to write, and so on. . . . Our doings are so intertwined that it is impossible to say where one ends and another begins. (Holloway 2002:26)”

Page 12 (12), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “It follows from this that true revolutionary practice is necessarily the struggle against iden- tity: It is the fracturing of doing that, through definition and classification, constitutes collective identities. . . . From the perspective of doing, definition can be no more than an evanescent positing of identity which is immediately tran- scended. . . . It is only if one takes identity as one’s stand- point, only if one starts from the acceptance of the rupture of doing, that labels such as “black,” “Jewish,” “Irish,” and so on, take on the character of something fixed. The idea of an “identity” politics which takes such labels as given inevitably contributes to the fixation of identities . . . the fracturing of doing, in short, the reinforcement of capital. (Holloway 2002:63–64)”

Page 12 (12), Underline (Red): Content: “John Holloway.”

Page 12 (12), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 12 (12), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “These insights led Holloway to two important conclusionsabout changing the world in the neoliberal age. The first isthat revolutionaries need to abandon the notion of achievingabsolute (as opposed to critical) knowledge. Knowledge thatseeks mastery of the world—what he calls “knowledgeabout”—denies its own entanglement with the object and the”

Page 12 (12), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “On some level, of course, people are perfectly aware of this.Yet, he notes, we nevertheless fall back into viewing the worldthrough the logic of identity, the tautology of A p A. Whyis it that we assume the world is made up of discrete self-identical objects that can be understood as the sum of theirproperties—especially when it appears to be contradicted onalmost every level of experience? ”

Page 13 (13), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “processes that make it what it is and leads necessarily to thelogic of coercive power and the state. In contrast, the type ofknowledge appropriate to a project of human liberation con-sists of a stripping away of the pretenses of identity to revealthe processes of action underneath. His second (and mostcontroversial) proposal, then, is that revolutionaries mustabandon the notion of effecting transformation through seiz-ing state power. The logic of the “state-form,” the commodityform, and identity are mutually reinforcing, he says, because,ultimately, they are one and the same. ”

Page 13 (13), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 14 (14), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “packed into this one statement are almost all theassumptions I have been describing under the rubric of theidentity machine. Social groups are assumed to be constitutednot primarily by their relations with one another but first andforemost by their relation with their own history. This his-tory—“culture” in its material form—is assumed to makethem what they are in the same way that an individual isassumed to be constituted, as an individual, by his or herown memory. This history/culture/identity is conceptualizedas something that these groups can—indeed, should—ownand control. To destroy that property is murder; to appro-priate it is theft.28 These are the assumptions that structured the Theravada Buddhist demand for secularism “as a human right” and for official constitutional recognition as Bud- dhist—not Hindu—citizens (see Leve 2007b).”

Page 14 (14), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Anthropological Options”

Page 14 (14), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “What Bhakta is voicing here, then, is the very vision of sub- jective personhood that I have been discussing in this paper— an ontology that has been globalized as part of political and economic liberalization in the shape of democratic policies, institutions, and norms.”

Page 14 (14), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 14 (14), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “When people represent themselvesas identity groups, they cast themselves as the owners of theiridentities and histories. The process is mediated through whatcan only be called an emerging global, neoliberal bureaucracy,which has now come to include national bureaucracies (alongwith NGOs, transnational corporations, and bodies such asthe UN, IMF, and WTO) as different levels within its ownadministrative structure”

Page 14 (14), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The identity machine is the point where the push from below begins to take on the shape and logic of the administrative apparatus to which it appeals.”

Page 14 (14), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ““If people have their own religions, literatures, and cultures,” he told me, “they’ll have a feeling of ownership, and they’ll resist the imposition of others.””

Page 14 (14), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 15 (15), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “for practi- tioners like the ones I have been discussing, Buddhism is far more than an identity. It is a practice that reveals the illusory nature of the self and the impermanence of all things. The truth that the Buddhist paradox expresses is that what we have been calling “identity” is a kind of “doing” in Holloway’s (2002) terms—a “doing” conditioned by forms of recognition and institutional action that reflect possessive individualist ideologies and ontologies.”

Page 15 (15), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “two paradoxes: (1) the Theravada Buddhists with whom she worked in Kath- mandu oppose any form of self-identity in their teachings and meditational practice but are willing nonetheless to par- ticipate in contemporary identity discourses in order to claim equal rights for Buddhism in the Nepalese public sphere that opened up after the revolution of 1990 and (2) a global “iden- tity machine” encourages people to articulate their demands and rework their own selves in line with the assumptions of possessive individualism, but this serves the interests of neo- liberal capitalism rather than their own best interests; some- times,”

Page 15 (15), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 21 (21), Underline (Red): Content: “Comaroff, J. 1996. Ethnicity, nationalism, and the politics of differ- ence in an age of revolution. In The politics of difference: ethnic differences in a world of power. E. Wilmsen and P. McAllister, eds. Pp. 162–183. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Comaroff, J., and J. L. Comaroff. 2001. Millennial capitalism: first thoughts on a second coming. In Millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism. J. and J. L. Comaroff, eds. Pp. 1–56. Dur- ham, NC: Duke University Press. Comaroff, J. L., and J. Comaroff. 2009. Ethnicity, Inc. Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press.”

Page 21 (21), Underline (Red): Content: “Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.”

Page 22 (22), Underline (Red): Content: “Durkheim, E. 1933 (1893). The division of labor in society. G. Simpson, trans. New York: Macmillan. [CJG]”

Page 22 (22), Underline (Red): Content: “Holloway, J. 2002. Change the world without taking power. London:Pluto. ”

Page 23 (23), Underline (Red): Content: “Mouffe, C. 1993. The return of the political. London: Verso. ———. 2000. Which ethics for democracy? In The turn to ethics.M. Garber, B. Hanssen, and R. Walkowitz, eds. Pp. 85–94. New York: Routledge.”

Page 23 (23), Underline (Red): Content: “Locke, J. 1813. An essay concerning human understanding. Boston: Cummings & Hilliard, Buckingham.”

Page 23 (23), Underline (Red): Content: “Macpherson, C. B. 1962. The political theory of possessive individu- alism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.”

Page 23 (23), Underline (Red): Content: “Re´e, J. 1992. Internationality. Radical Philosophy 60:3–11.”

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