Viveiros de Castro—Immanence and Fear

Immanence and Fear: Stranger-events and Subjects in Amazonia

by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, translated by David Rodgers

[Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2012. “Immanence and Fear: Stranger-Events and Subjects in Amazonia.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (1): 27–43.]

“As we know, a minimal amount of imagination is needed to be afraid” (28).

“I wish to talk about the forms of fear in the native societies of Amazonia, or more precisely, about another way of relating to fear exemplified by these societies” (29).

Quem tem cu tem meed,””Anyone with an asshole feels fear” (29).

“Here I need to return to a typical motif of indigenous cosmopraxis, one about which I have already written so exhaustively that the reader might be already familiar with it. I refer to Amerindian “cosmological perspectivism,” the idea according to which each species or type of being is endowed with a prosopomorphic or anthropomorphic apperception, seeing itself as a “person,” while it sees the other components of its own eco-system as non-persons or non-humans. Some are seen as prey animals or predatory animals (everything has its own jaguar), or as spirits (invariably cannibal, or sexually voracious). Other components of the eco-system are seen as artefacts of one‘s self-own culture: jaguars see humans as peccaries, and see the blood of the prey that they kill as maize beer; the dead see the crickets as fish, the tapirs see the salt licks where they gather as large ceremonial houses, etc. (Much of what I say here about animals can also be said about the dead since, in various aspects, animals are like the dead and the dead are like animals. That is, the dead are not human.) Thus, each species occupies “in” culture the position that humans (that is, the humans‘ humans) see themselves as occupying in relation to the rest of the cosmos. Hence, it is not just a question of each species identifying itself as a culturally defined humanity: perspectivism also means that each species possesses a particular way of perceiving alterity, a “consensual hallucination” device which makes it see the world in a characteristic way” (33).

“Having different eyes, however, does not mean seeing “the same things” in a different “way”; it means that you don‘t know what the other is seeing when he “says” that he is seeing the same thing as you: we do not understand anacondas. The problem is one of perceptive “homonymy,” not “synonymy.” Perspectivism is not a trans-specific multiculturalism stating that each species possesses a particular subjective “point of view” of a real objective, unique and self-subsistent world. It is not Anthropology 101—”various cultures and one nature.” Perspectivism does not state the existence of a multiplicity of points of view, but the existence of the point of view as a multiplicity. There is just “one” point of view, the one which humans share—like the anus—with every other species of being: the point of view of culture. What varies is the objective correlative of the point of view: what passes through the optic nerve (or digestive tube) of each species, so to speak. In other words, perspectivism does not presume a Thing-in-Itself partially apprehended by the categories of understanding proper to each species. I do not believe that the Indians imagine that there is a thing-in-itself which humans see as blood and jaguars see as beer. There are not differently categorized self-identical substances, but immediately relational multiplicities of the blood-beer, salt lick-ceremonial-house, cricket-fish type. There is no x which is blood for one species and beer for the other: there exists a blood-beer which is one of the singularities characteristic of the human-jaguar multiplicity. [  … paragraph ] What defines these perspectival multiplicities is their incompatibility. A human and a jaguar cannot be people at the same time; it is impossible to experience blood as beer without having-already-become a jaguar. Perspectivism states that each species sees itself as people. However, it also states that two species cannot see each other simultaneously as people. Each species has to be capable of not losing sight, so to speak, of the fact that the others see themselves as people and, simultaneously, capable of forgetting this fact—that is, of “no longer seeing it.” (34).

Supernatural regime—”a situation in which the subject of a perspective, or “self,” is suddenly transformed into an object in the perspective of another being” (36).

Appearances deceive because one can never be sure whose or which is the dominant point of view. One can never be sure, that is, which world is in force when one interacts with the Other.”

“I see these supernatural encounters in the forest, where the self is captured by an other, and defined by it as its ―second person,‖ as a kind of indigenous proto-experience of the State” (37).

“In an earlier work, I argued that the constitutive problem of Western modernity, namely, solipsism—the supposition that the other is merely a body, that it does not harbour a soul like that of the self: the absence of communication as an anxiety-ridden horizon of the self—had as its Amazonian equivalent the (positive or negative) obsession with cannibalism and the affirmation of the latent transformability of bodies. In a cosmos totally impregnated with subjecthood, the dominant supposition-fear is that what we eat are always, in the final analysis, souls: an excess of communication, the dangerous transparency of the world …

“I wish to suggest that the true equivalent of the “indigenous category of the supernatural” are not “our” extraordinary or paranormal experiences (alien abductions, ESP, mediumship, premonition), but the quotidian experience, perfectly terrifying in its very normality, of existing under a State. The famous poster of Uncle Sam with his finger pointing in your face, looking directly at anyone who allowed their gaze to be captured by him, is for me the perfect icon of the State: “I want you.” An Amazonian Indian would immediately know what this evil spirit is talking about, and, pretending not to hear, would look elsewhere” (37).

“the world of immanent humanity is also a world of immanent divinity, a world where divinity is distributed under the form of a potential infinity of non-human subjects. This is a world where hosts of minuscule gods wander the earth; a “myriatheism,” … This is the world that has been called animist, that is, now to use the terms of our inanimist tradition, a world where the object is a particular case of the subject, where every object is a subject in potentia. Instead of the solipsistic formula “I think, therefore I am” the indigenous cogito must be articulated in animistc terms, as in, “It exists, therefore it thinks.” But there, where on top of this the Self is a particular case of the Other, such “animism” must necessarily take the form of—if you excuse the pun—an “enemism”: an animism altered by alterity, an alterity that gets animated insofar as it is thought of as an enemy interiority: a Self that is radically Other. Hence the danger, and the brilliance, of such worlds” (41).

Abstract

This article proposes to explore the political correlates of Amazonian perspectival ontologies. From a Taulipang mythical narrative about the origin of the anus (as transcribed by Koch-Grünberg) to a Nambikwara explanation of Brazilian I.D. cards (as reported by Joana Miller), Amazonian ethnography allows us to perceive how “bodily” affects and “spiritual” encounters conspire to project a particular conception of power, sociality and truth.

Annotation Summary for: Viveiros de Castro – Immanence and Fear

Page 1, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Immanence and fear Stranger-events and subjects in Amazonia Eduardo VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, Translated by David Rodgers.

This article proposes to explore the political correlates of Amazonian perspectival ontologies. From a Taulipang mythical narrative about the origin of the anus (as transcribed by Koch-Grünberg) to a Nambikwara explanation of Brazilian I.D. cards (as reported by Joana Miller), Amazonian ethnography allows us to perceive how ―bodily‖ affects and ―spiritual‖ encounters conspire to project a particular conception of power, sociality and truth.”

Page 2, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “As we know, a minimal amount of imagination is needed to be afraid. Even the so-called instinctive fears, the ―animal fears,‖ are but acts of imagination embedded in the ethogram of our species through a painful originary and immemorial learning, as we have learned from Friedrich Nietzsche and Samuel Butler.”

Page 2, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Since we need to learn, to have learned, to be afraid.”

Page 3, Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” It seems that the spread of “Reason” has ruthlessly increased our reasons for being afraid. That is, if reason has not itself become the very thing to be feared. And it was we who enjoyed the pleasure of complacently ironizing the fears of the ―poor primitives‖: they were afraid of other men, afraid of the natural forces. Precisely we, who are in perpetual—if justified—panic of the fierce fourth-world immigrants as well as of the inexorable global warming. An unexpected proof of Latour‘s thesis: we have really never been modern”

Page 3, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I wish to talk about the forms of fear in the native societies of Amazonia, or more precisely, about another way of relating to fear exemplified by these societies.”

Page 3, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “―Quem tem cu tem meed,‖ ―Anyone with an asshole feels fear.‖”

Page 4, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Presumably, this is a way of saying that fear (like the anus) is not something we are likely to be proud of or parade, yet it remains undeniably part of us and fulfils the humble but indispensable function of helping in the afflictions of life.”

Page 4, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Pu‘iito, how people and animals received their anus In the deep past, animals and people lacked an anus with which to defecate. I think they defecated through their mouths. Pu‘iito, the anus, wandered around, slowly and cautiously, farting in the faces of animals and people, and then running away. So the animals said: ―Let‘s grab Pu‘iito, so we can divide him up between us!‖ Many gathered and said: ―We‘ll pretend that we‘re asleep! When he arrives, we‘ll catch him!‖ So that‘s what they did. Pu‘iito arrived and farted in the face of one of them. They ran after Pu‘iito, but couldn‘t catch him and were left trailing behind. The parrots Kuliwaí and Kaliká got close to Pu‘iito. They ran and ran. Finally they caught him and tied him up. Then the others who had been left behind arrived: tapir, deer, curassow, Spix‘s guan, piping guan, dove. . . . They began to share him out. Tapir eagerly asked for a piece. The parrots cut a large piece and threw it to the other animals. Tapir immediately grabbed it. That‘s why his anus is so huge. The parrot cut a small, appropriately-sized piece for himself. The deer received a smaller piece than tapir‘s. The doves took a little piece. Toad arrived and asked them to give him a piece too. The parrots threw a piece in his direction, which stuck on his back: that‘s why even today the toad‘s anus is on his back. That was how we acquired our anuses. Were we without them today, we‘d have to defecate through our mouths, or explode.”

Page 5, Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” The history of Pu‘iito describes the original, common condition of mythic beings in their pre-corporal, or rather, pre-organic—and yet an anthropo-morphic and anthropo-logical state—a state in which the anus was a person (a spiritual angelic anus, so to speak). It narrates the moment when the organ in question leaves its ―intensive‖ existence, as a part identical to its own (w)hole, and is ―extensified,‖ collectively invested and distributed (shared) among the animal species. ”

Page 5, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “An eye for a tooth, a tooth for an eye”

Page 5, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The pre-cosmological world described by Amerindian myths is a world completely saturated with personhood.”

Page 5, Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” The emergence of the species and the stabilization of the food chain (processes described in the myths), have not extinguished this originary universal personhood; they have merely put it into a state of dangerous non-appearance, that is, a state of latency or potentiality. Every being encountered by a human over the course of producing his or her own life may suddenly allow its ―other side‖ (a common idiom in indigenous cosmologies) to eclipse its usual non-human appearance, actualizing its latent humanoid condition and automatically placing at risk the life of the human interlocutor.”

Page 6, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In sum, these are worlds where humanity is immanent, as R. Wagner puts it; that is, worlds where the primordial takes human form; which does not make it in any sense comforting, much the opposite: there where all things are human, the human is something else entirely. And there where all things are human, nobody can be certain of being unconditionally human, because nobody is—including ourselves.”

Page 7, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “if persons are the epitome of what should not be judged by appearances, and if all (or almost all) types of beings are people, we can never take appearances at face value. What appears to be a human may be an animal or a spirit; what appears to be an animal or human may be a spirit, and so on. Things change—especially when they arepersons. ”

Page 7, Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” Here I need to return to a typical motif of indigenous cosmopraxis, one about which I have already written so exhaustively that the reader might be already familiar with it. I refer to Amerindian ―cosmological perspectivism,‖ the idea according to which each species or type of being is endowed with a prosopomorphic or anthropomorphic apperception, seeing itself as a ―person,‖ while it sees the other components of its own eco-system as non-persons or non-humans. Some are seen as prey animals or predatory animals (everything has its own jaguar), or as spirits (invariably cannibal, or sexually voracious). Other components of the eco-system are seen as artefacts of one‘s self-own culture: jaguars see humans as peccaries, and see the blood of the prey that they kill as maize beer; the dead see the crickets as fish, the tapirs see the salt licks where they gather as large ceremonial houses, etc. (Much of what I say here about animals can also be said about the dead since, in various aspects, animals are like the dead and the dead are like animals. That is, the dead are not human.) Thus, each species occupies ―in‖ culture the position that humans (that is, the humans‘ humans) see themselves as occupying in relation to the rest of the cosmos. Hence, it is not just a question of each species identifying itself as a culturally defined humanity: perspectivism also means that each species possesses a particular way of perceiving alterity, a ―consensual hallucination‖ device which makes it see the world in a characteristic way. ”

Page 7, Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 7, Highlight (Yellow): Content: “―cosmological perspectivism,‖”

Page 7, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “This perspectival divergence of the species is frequently attributed to the quality of eyes possessed by each species. The Ye‘kuana of Venezuela say: ―Each people have their own eyes. . . . The people [humans] can‘t understand the anacondas because they have different eyes . . .‖ (Civrieux 1985: 65–66).”

Page 7, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Having different eyes, however, does not mean seeing ―the same things‖ in a different ―way‖; it means that you don‘t know what the other is seeing when he ―says‖ that he is seeing the same thing as you: we do not understand anacondas. The problem is one of perceptive ―homonymy,‖ not ―synonymy.‖ Perspectivism is not a trans-specific multiculturalism stating that each species possesses a particular subjective ―point of view‖ of a real objective, unique and self-subsistent world. It is”

Page 7, Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 8, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “not Anthropology 101—―various cultures and one nature.‖ Perspectivism does not state the existence of a multiplicity of points of view, but the existence of the point of view as a multiplicity. There is just ―one‖ point of view, the one which humans share—like the anus—with every other species of being: the point of view of culture. What varies is the objective correlative of the point of view: what passes through the optic nerve (or digestive tube) of each species, so to speak. In other words, perspectivism does not presume a Thing-in-Itself partially apprehended by the categories of understanding proper to each species. I do not believe that the Indians imagine that there is a thing-in-itself which humans see as blood and jaguars see as beer. There are not differently categorized self-identical substances, but immediately relational multiplicities of the blood-beer, salt lick-ceremonial-house, cricket-fish type. There is no x which is blood for one species and beer for the other: there exists a blood-beer which is one of the singularities characteristic of the human-jaguar multiplicity. ”

Page 8, Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 8, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “What defines these perspectival multiplicities is their incompatibility. A human and a jaguar cannot be people at the same time; it is impossible to experience blood as beer without having-already-become a jaguar. Perspectivism states that each species sees itself as people. However, it also states that two species cannot see each other simultaneously as people. Each species has to be capable of not losing sight, so to speak, of the fact that the others see themselves as people and, simultaneously, capable of forgetting this fact—that is, of ―no longer seeing it.‖ ”

Page 9, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The heart of the lonely hunter”

Page 10, Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” The police, like the spirits, are always on the lookout for the chance to transform somebody into a nobody and then make them disappear. Here we are approaching what seems to me to be the context par excellence for experiencing fear in indigenous Amazonia: entry into a ―supernatural‖ regime. I use this term to designate a situation in which the subject of a perspective, or ―self,‖ is suddenly transformed into an object in the perspective of another being.”

Page 10, Highlight (Yellow): Content: “―supernatural‖ regime. ”

Page 10, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “This is the ―war of the worlds‖ that forms the backdrop to Amerindian cosmo-praxis. The typical confrontation takes place in the encounter outside the village between a person who is alone (a hunter, a woman collecting firewood, etc.) and a being that at first sight looks like an animal or person—sometimes a relative (living or dead) of the subject. The entity then interpellates the human: the animal, for example, speaks to the hunter, protesting against his treatment of itself as prey; or it looks ―strangely‖ at him, while the hunter‘s arrows fail to injure it; the pseudo-relative invites the subject to follow it, or to eat something it is carrying. The reaction to the entity’s initiative is decisive. ”

Page 10, Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” If the human accepts the dialogue or the invitation, if he or she responds to the interpellation, the person is lost: he/she will be inevitably overpowered by the non-human subjectivity, passing over to itsside, transforming him/herself into a being of the same species as the speaker. ”

Page 10, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The canonical form of these encounters, then, consists in suddenly finding out that the other is ―human,‖ or rather, that it is the other that is human, which automatically dehumanizes and alienates the interlocutor.”

Page 10, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “As a context in which a human subject is captured by another cosmologically dominant”

Page 11, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “point of view, where he/she becomes the ―you‖ of a non-human perspective, Supernature is the form of the Other as Subject, implying an objectification of the human ―I‖ as a ―you‖ for this Other.”

Page 11, Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 11, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “This, in sum, would be the true meaning of the Amerindian disquiet over what is hidden behind appearances. Appearances deceive because one can never be sure whose or which is the dominant point of view. One can never be sure, that is, which world is in force when one interacts with the Other.”

Page 11, Underline (Red): Content: “Althusserian”

Page 11, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I see these supernatural encounters in the forest, where the self is captured by an other, and defined by it as its ―second person,‖ as a kind of indigenous proto-experience of the State. In an earlier work, I argued that the constitutive problem of Western modernity, namely, solipsism—the supposition that the other is merely a body, that it does not harbour a soul like that of the self: the absence of communication as an anxiety-ridden horizon of the self—had as its Amazonian equivalent the (positive or negative) obsession with cannibalism and the affirmation of the latent transformability of bodies. In a cosmos totally impregnated with subjecthood, the dominant supposition-fear is that what we eat are always, in the final analysis, souls: an excess of communication, the dangerous transparency of the world. ”

Page 11, Note (Orange): Cannibal metaphysics

Page 11, Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” I wish to suggest that the true equivalent of the ―indigenous category of the supernatural‖ are not ―our‖ extraordinary or paranormal experiences (alien abductions, ESP, mediumship, premonition), but the quotidian experience, perfectly terrifying in its very normality, of existing under a State. The famous poster of Uncle Sam with his finger pointing in your face, looking directly at anyone who allowed their gaze to be captured by him, is for me the perfect icon of the State: ―I want you.‖ An Amazonian Indian would immediately know what this evil spirit is talking about, and, pretending not to hear, would look elsewhere. ”

Page 11, Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 11, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “we feel the same fear Clearly, all of us almost always escape. Almost always nothing happens: or more exactly, something always almost-happens. This is precisely how the”

Page 11, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “on having our passport examined by Immigration in a foreign country, on crossing the metal detectors found in public buildings across the planet, on disembarking in an absolute non-place such as an international airport, on seeing the banknote we used to make a purchase checked for its authenticity by the shop assistant, on seeing yourself caught by a CCTV camera, and so on.”

Page 12, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “subjectivities that wander the forest are typically experienced by the Indians—they are usually only almost-seen, communication is almost-established, and the result is always an almost-death. The almost-event is the Supernatural‘s default mode of existence. We need to have almost-died to be able to tell.”

Page 12, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The enemy as immanence”

Page 12, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “If we accept my recontextualization of the concept of Supernature,”

Page 12, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Hunting is, in a sense, the supreme supernatural context—from the perspective of both animals (when the hunter succeeds) and humans (when things go wrong and the hunter becomes”

Page 13, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “prey).”

Page 13, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “A telling example of this enemy-becoming can be found in Araweté war songs, in which a killer repeats words taught to him by the spirit of the victim during the ritual seclusion that follows the killing: the killer speaks from the enemy‘s point of view, saying ―I‖ to refer to the self of the enemy and ―him‖ to refer to himself. In order to become a full subject (for the killing of an enemy is a precondition to adult male status in many an Amerindian society), the killer must apprehend the enemy ―from the inside,‖ that is, as a subject. The analogy with the perspectival theory, according to which non-human subjectivities see humans as non-humans and vice-versa, is obvious. The killer must be able to see himself as the enemy sees him—as, precisely, an enemy in order to become ―himself,‖ or rather, a ―myself.‖”

Page 13, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “connection with modern ideas of property is obvious. To quote Marilyn Strathern quoting someone else quoting yet another source: Davis and Naffine (2001: 9) quote the observation, for instance, that western property is based on self possession as a primordial property right which grounds all others. This axiom holds whether or not the”

Page 14, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “self-owning individual is given in the world (being ultimately owned by God, Locke) or has to fashion that condition out of it (through its owns struggling, Hegel). (Strathern 2006: 23n57)”

Page 14, Underline (Red): Content: “Locke) Hegel).”

Page 14, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The problem, from the standpoint of Amerindian thought—or rather, from the standpoint of our understanding of this thought, is the following: what does a world where it is the foe, not the friend, that functions as a transcendental lived condition look like? That was, after all, the real question behind the theme of perspectivism: if the concept of ―perspectivism‖ is nothing but the idea of the Other as such, what is it like to live in a world constituted by the enemy’s point of view? A world where enmity is not a mere privative complement of ―amity‖, a simple negative facticity, but a de jure structure of thought, a positivity in its own right? And then—what regime of truth can thrive in this world where distance connects and difference relates?”

Page 14, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “It is true that God no longer enjoys the limelight of history (rumour has it he is preparing a triumphal return). But before he died, he took two providential measures: he migrated to the inner sanctum of every individual as the intensive, intelligible form of the Subject (Kant‘s Moral Law), and he exteriorized himself as Object, that is, as the infinite extensive field of Nature (Kant‘s starry heaven). Culture and Nature, in short, the two worlds in which Supernature as originary otherness divided itself. ”

Page 14, Underline (Red): Content: “(Kant‘s”

Page 14, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the world of immanent humanity is also a world of immanent divinity, a world where divinity is distributed under the form of a potential infinity of non-human subjects. This is a”

Page 15, Highlight (Cyan): Content: “world where hosts of minuscule gods wander the earth; a ―myriatheism,‖ This is the world that has been called animist, that is, now to use the terms of our inanimist tradition, a world where the object is a particular case of the subject, where every object is a subject in potentia. Instead of the solipsistic formula ―I think, therefore I am‖ the indigenous cogito must be articulated in animistc terms, as in, ―It exists, therefore it thinks.‖ But there, where on top of this the Self is a particular case of the Other, such ―animism‖ must necessarily take the form of—if you excuse the pun—an ―enemism‖: an animism altered by alterity, an alterity that gets animated insofar as it is thought of as an enemy interiority: a Self that is radically Other. Hence the danger, and the brilliance, of such worlds. ”

Page 15, Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 15, Underline (Red): Content: “Crapanzano, Vincent. 2003. Imaginative horizons: an essay in literary- philosophical anthropology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.”

Page 15, Underline (Red): Content: “Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1972. L‘Anti-Œdipe. Paris: Minuit. ———.1991. Qu‘est-ce que la philosophie? Paris: Minuit.”

Page 16, Underline (Red): Content: “Kohn, Eduardo O. 2002. ―Natural engagements and ecological aesthetics among the Ávila Runa of Amazonian Ecuador.‖ Ph.D. diss., Madison: University of Wisconsin.”

Page 16, Underline (Red): Content: “Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 2006. A origem dos modos à mesa. São Paulo: CosacNaify. Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.”

Page 16, Underline (Red): Content: “Sahlins, Marshall. 1983. ―Raw women, cooked man, and other ‗great things‘ of the Fiji Islands‖. In The ethnography of cannibalism, edited by Paula Brown and Donald Tuzin, Anthropology. 72–93. Washington D.C.: Society for Pyschological ”

Page 16, Underline (Red): Content: “Strathern, Marilyn. 2006. ―Divided origins and the arithmetic of ownership.‖ In Accelerating possession: global futures of property and personhood, edited by Bill Maurer and Gabriele Schwab, 135–73. New York: Columbia University Press.”

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