Shapin & Schaffer—Leviathan and the Air-Pump

Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life

by Steven Shapin & Simon Schaffer

[Shapin, Steven, and Simon Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.]

Points

  • To interrogate questions like “Why is it that we do experiments to determine “matters of fact?” S&S look to the controversy surrounding the first laboratory experiments=Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiment (and Hobbes’s critiques of them)
    • by approaching the topic like a “stranger”—even though we have come to see controlled experiments as creators of scientific fact, S&S ask what someone at the time would think of the controversy, avoiding presentism
  • Very basically:
    • Boyle wants to “see the house of natural philosophy in order by remedying its divisions and by with­drawing it from contentious links with civic philosophy” (21). In other words, our society is jacked-up, but we can make it so that science (natural philosophy) is not so jacked-up. How? Controlled laboratory experiments!
    • Hobbes disagreed, saying that “order was only to be ensured by erecting a demonstrative philosophy that allowed no boundaries between the natural, the human, and the social, and which allowed for no dissent within it” (21). In other words, what is true is true in all aspects and you can’t just carve one facet of that truth out.
    • In other other words: “Robert Boyle maintained that proper natural philosophical knowl­edge should be generated through experiment and that the foun­dations of such knowledge were to be constituted by experimentally produced matters of fact. Thomas Hobbes disagreed. In Hobbes’s view Boyle’s procedures could never yield the degree of certainty requisite in any enterprise worthy of being called philosophical” (22).

Air-Pump

  • Boyle (S&S argue) used three technologies in his experiments
    1. material technology—the air-pump itself and its use in experimentation
    2. literary technology—descriptions of the apparatus, the experiments, and the laboratory space as well as the findings of the experiments published and disseminated to the public at large
    3. social technology—the idea of “witnessing” (see below).

witnessing – three ways to multiply it

  1. make it public—use a laboratory
    • “The space where these machines worked—the nascent laboratory—was to be a public space, but a restricted public space, as critics like Hobbes were soon to point out. The phenomena were not on show anywhere at all. The laboratory was, therefore, a disciplined space, where experimental, discursive, and social practices were collectively controlled by competent members” (39).
  2. make it replicable—so others can witness it by doing the same thing elsewhere
    • This was more of a theoretical aim than a realistic one. The cost pf air-pumps, their rarity, and their different designs made direct replication almost impossible.
    • Not to mention the fact that Boyles’s air-pump leaked—something that Hobbes talked about. A lot.
  3. “virtual witnessing”—write it down in detail, and readers will witness it in their imagination
    • This could possibly reach and infinite number of witnesses, but it depends completely on the reader trusting the account, which feeds back into Hobbes’s critique of the laboratory: the people involved had to be beyond reproach, so only members of exclusive social and professional circles (The Royal Society) could contribute. They got to actually witness, so countless others could virtually witness.
    • “first, the witnessing experience had to be made acces­sible; second, witnesses had to be reliable and their testimony had to be creditable. The first condition worked to open up experi­mental space, while the second acted to restrict entry” (336).

Conclusion—scientific “matters of fact” are actually political creations

  • “There are three senses in which we want to say that the history of science occupies the same terrain as the history of politics. First, scientific practitioners have created, selected, and maintained a polity within which they operate and make their intellectual prod­uct; second, the intellectual product made within that polity has become an element in political activity in the state; third, there is a conditional relationship between the nature of the polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity” (332).
  • By the end S&S have shown “(1) that the solution to the problem of knowledge is political; it is predicated upon laying down rules and conventions of relations between men in the intellectual polity; (2) that the knowledge thus produced and authenticated becomes an element in political action in the wider polity; it is impossible that we should come to under­ stand the nature of political action in the state without referring to the products of the intellectual polity; (3) that the contest among alternative forms of life and their characteristic forms of intellectual product depends upon the political success of the various candi­dates in insinuating themselves into the activities of other institu­tions and other interest groups. He who has the most, and the most powerful, allies wins” (342).

Or more briefly said:

  • “As we come to recognize the conventional and artifactual status of our forms of knowing, we put ourselves in a position to realize that it is ourselves and not reality that is responsible for what we know. Knowledge, as much as the state, is the product of human actions” (344).
    • Even Boyle—who championed scientific experimentation and the ideals of natural fact divorced from all societal influence—could only prove his point through the use of social structures and media dissemination, erasing any pretense of nature’s ability to stand alone.
    • “Hobbes was right” (344).

Abstract

Leviathan and the Air-Pump examines the conflicts over the value and propriety of experimental methods between two major seventeenth-century thinkers: Thomas Hobbes, author of the political treatise Leviathan and vehement critic of systematic experimentation in natural philosophy, and Robert Boyle, mechanical philosopher and owner of the newly invented air-pump. The issues at stake in their disputes ranged from the physical integrity of the air-pump to the intellectual integrity of the knowledge it might yield. Both Boyle and Hobbes were looking for ways of establishing knowledge that did not decay into ad hominem attacks and political division. Boyle proposed the experiment as cure. He argued that facts should be manufactured by machines like the air-pump so that gentlemen could witness the experiments and produce knowledge that everyone agreed on. Hobbes, by contrast, looked for natural law and viewed experiments as the artificial, unreliable products of an exclusive guild. The new approaches taken in Leviathan and the Air-Pump have been enormously influential on historical studies of science. Shapin and Schaffer found a moment of scientific revolution and showed how key scientific givens—facts, interpretations, experiment, truth—were fundamental to a new political order. Shapin and Schaffer were also innovative in their ethnographic approach. Attempting to understand the work habits, rituals, and social structures of a remote, unfamiliar group, they argued that politics were tied up in what scientists did, rather than what they said. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer use the confrontation between Hobbes and Boyle as a way of understanding what was at stake in the early history of scientific experimentation. They describe the protagonists’ divergent views of natural knowledge, and situate the Hobbes-Boyle disputes within contemporary debates over the role of intellectuals in public life and the problems of social order and assent in Restoration England. In a new introduction, the authors describe how science and its social context were understood when this book was first published, and how the study of the history of science has changed since then.

Annotation Summary for: Shapin & Schaffer – Leviathan and the Air-Pump_

Page 3 (17), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “OUR subject is experiment. We want to understand the nature and status of experimental practices and their intellectual products.”

Page 3 (17), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We start, with that great paradigm of experimental proce­ dure: Robert Boyle’s researches in pneumatics and his employment of the air-pump in that enterprise.”

Page 4 (18), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Boyle’s pneumatic experiments of the 1660s were designed to provide (and have since provided) a heuristic model of how authentic scientific knowledge should be secured.”

Page 4 (18), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Being a member of the culture one seeks to understand has enormous advantages. Indeed, it is difficult to see how one could understand a culture to which one was a complete stranger. Nevertheless, unreflective membership also carries with it serious disadvantages to the search for under­ standing, and the chief of these might be called “the self-evident”

Page 5 (19), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “method.'””

Page 5 (19), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “, See, for example, Douglas, “Self-Evidence.””

Page 6 (20), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We need to play the stranger, not to be the stranger. A genuine stranger is simply ignorant. We wish to adopt a calculated and an informed suspension of our taken-for-granted perceptions of experimental practice and its products. By playing the strangerwe hope to move away from self-evidence. ”

Page 6 (20), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “How can the historian play the stranger to experimental culture, a culture we are said to share with a setting in the past and of which one of our subjects is said to be the founder? One means we can use is”

Page 7 (21), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the identification and examination of episodes of controversy in the past.”

Page 7 (21), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Historical instances of controversy over natural phenomena or intellectual practices have two advantages, from our point of view. One is that they often involve disagreements over the reality of entities or propriety of practices whose existence or value are subsequently taken to be unproblematic or settled. Another advantage afforded by studying controversy is that historical actors frequently play a role analogous to that of our pretend-stranger: in the course of controversy they attempt to deconstruct the taken­ for-granted quality of their antagonists’ preferred beliefs and prac­ tices, and they do this by trying to display the artifactual and con­ ventional status of those beliefs and practices.”

Page 7 (21), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The controversy with which we are concerned took place in Eng­ land in the 1660s and early 1670s. The protagonists were Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1 679).”

Page 7 (21), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Boyle ap­ pears as the major practitioner of systematic experimentation and one of the most important propagandists for the value of experi­ mental practices in natural philosophy. Hobbes takes the role of Boyle’s most vigorous local opponent, seeking to undermine the Boyle’s re­ particular claims and interpretations produced by searches and, crucially, mobilizing powerful arguments why the experimental programme could not produce the sort of knowledge Boyle recommended.”

Page 8 (22), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “”Whig” history,”

Page 11 (25), Note (Orange): Boundary work

Page 11 (25), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “a dismissal, the ru­ diments of a causal explanation of the rejected knowledge (which implicitly acts to justify the dismissal), and an asymmetrical han­ dling of rejected and accepted knowledge. First, it is established that the rejected knowledge is not knowledge at all, but error.”

Page 12 (26), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “historians have drawn upon the notion of “misun­ derstanding” (and the reasons for it) as the basis of their causal accounting and dismissal of Hobbes’s position.”

Page 12 (26), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Since our way of proceeding will dispense with the category of “misunderstanding” and the asymmetries associated with it, some words on method are indicated here.”

Page 12 (26), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Almost needless to say, our purpose is not evaluative: it is descriptive and explanatory.”

Page 14 (28), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “More im­ portant to our project is an examination of method understood as re�l practical activity. For example,”

Page 14 (28), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “we shall devote much attention to such questions as: How is an experimental matter of fact actually produced? What are the practical criteria for judging experimental success or failure? How, and to what extent, are experiments ac­ tually replicated, and what is it that enables replication to take place? How is the experimental boundary between fact and theory actually managed? Are there crucial experiments and, if so, on what grounds are they accounted crucial?”

Page 14 (28), Stamp (Question Mark (?, Red))

Page 14 (28), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “we shallbe concerned to show the connections between the conduct of thenatural philosophical community and Restoration society in gen­eral. However, we also mean something else when we use the term”social context.” We intend to display scientific method as crystal­lizing forms of social organization and as a means of regulatingsocial interaction within the scientific community.”

Page 21 (35), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We seek to show here the nature of the intersection between the history of natural philosophy and the history of political thought arid action. One solution (Boyle;s) was to seethe house ofnatural philosophy in order by remedying its divisions and by with­drawing it from contentious links with civic philosophy. Another so­ lution (Hobbes’s) demanded that order was only to be ensured by erecting a demonstrative philosophy that allowed no boundaries between the natural, the human, and the social, and which allowed for no dissent within it.”

Page 21 (35), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 21 (35), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In the concluding chapter we draw out some of the implications of this study for the history of science and the history of politics. We argue that the problem of generating and protecting knowledge is a problem in politics, and, conversely, that the problem of political order always involves solutions to the problem of knowledge.”

Page 22 (36), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “. II . Seeing and Believing: The Experimental Production of Pneumatic Facts”

Page 22 (36), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “ROBERT Boyle maintained that proper natural philosophical knowl­ edge should be generated through experiment and that the foun­ dations of such knowledge were to be constituted by experimentally produced matters of fact. Thomas Hobbes disagreed. In Hobbes’s view Boyle’s procedures could never yield the degree of certainty requisite in any enterprise worthy of being called philosophical. This book is about that dispute and about the issues that were seen to depend upon its resolution.”

Page 22 (36), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 22 (36), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In this chapter we intend to address the problem of self-evidence by dissecting and displaying the mechanisms by which Boyle’s experimental pro­ cedures were held to produce knowledge and, in particular, the variety of knowledge called “matters of fact.” We will show that the experimental production of matters of fact involved an immense amount of labour, that it rested upon the acceptance of certain social and discursive conventions, and that it depended upon the production and protection of a special form of social organization.”

Page 25 (39), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We will show that the establishment of matters of fact in Boyle’s experimental programme utilized three technologies : a material tech­ nology embedded in the construction and operation of the air­ pump; a literary technology by means of which the phenomena pro­ duced by the pump were made known to those who were not direct witnesses; and a social technology that incorporated the conventions experimental philosophers should use in dealing with each other and considering knowledge-claims.4”

Page 25 (39), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 25 (39), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “each embedded the others.”

Page 26 (40), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “THE MATERIAL TECHNOLOGY OF THE AIR- PUMP”

Page 26 (40), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Otto von Guer­”

Page 26 (40), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “icke’s device, this earlier machine (see figure 22) had several practical disadvantages: (1) it needed to be immersed in a large volume of water; (2) it was a solid vessel, such that experimental apparatus could not be inserted in it; and (3) it was extremely difficult to operate,”

Page 29 (43), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Small cracks were not, in Boyle’s view, necessarily fatal. The greater external pressure could act to press them together, and he provided a recipe for fixing them if required: a mixture of powdered quick-lime, cheese scrapings and water, ground up into a paste “to have a strong and stinking smell,” spread onto linen plasters and applied to the crack.””

Page 30 (44), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The reasons for our detailed treatment of the physical integrity of the air-pump and the steps Boyle took to guarantee itwill become clear below. For the present, we simply note threepoints: (1) that both the engine’s integrity and its limited leakagewere important resources for Boyle in validating his pneumatic findings and their proper interpretation; (2) that the physical in­tegrity of the machine was vital to the perceived integrity of the knowledge the machine helped to produce; and (3) that the lack of its physical integrity was a strategy used by critics, particularly Hobbes, to deconstruct Boyle’s claims and to substitute alternative accounts. ”

Page 30 (44), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “EMBLEM THE AIR-PUMP AS EMBLEM”

Page 36 (50), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “THE PUMP AND THE “EMPIRE OF THE SENSES””

Page 36 (50), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The experi­ mental philosophy, empiricist and inductivist, depended upon the generation of matters of fact that were objects of perceptual ex­ perience.”

Page 38 (52), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Just as the reason disciplined the senses, and was disciplined by it, so the new scientific instruments disciplined sensory observation through their control of access.”

Page 39 (53), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the intricacy of these machines and their limited availability posed a problem of access that experimental philoso­ phers laboured to overcome.”

Page 39 (53), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 39 (53), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The space where these machines worked-the nascent laboratory-was to be a public space, but a restricted public space, as critics like Hobbes were soon to point out. The phenomena were not on show anywhere at all. The laboratory was, therefore, a disciplined space, where experimental, discursive, and social practices were collectively controlled by competent members.”

Page 40 (54), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Two EXPERIMENTS”

Page 41 (55), Underline (Red): Content: “”Torricellian space””

Page 45 (59), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Boyle was not “a vacuist” nor did he undertake his New Experiments to prove a vac­ uum. Neither was he “a plenist,” and he mobilized powerful ar­ guments against the mechanical and nonmechanical principles ad­ duced by those who maintained that a vacuum was impossible.40″

Page 45 (59), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 46 (60), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “What he was endeavouring to create was a natural philosophicaldiscourse in which such questions were inadmissible. The air-pumpcould not decide whether or not a “metaphysical” vacuum existed.”

Page 46 (60), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Boyle allowed himself to use the term “vacuum” in relation to the contents of the evacuated receiver, while giving the term experimental meaning.”

Page 46 (60), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Boyle’s “vacuum” was a space “almost totally devoid of air”: The finite leakage of the pump was not, in his view, a fatal flaw but a valuable resource in accounting for experimental findings and in exemplifying the proper usage of terms like “vacuum.””

Page 49 (63), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “FACTS AND CAUSES: THE SPRING, PRESSURE, AND WEIGHT OF THE AIR”

Page 49 (63), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “What New Experiments did was to exemplify a work­ ing philosophy of scientific knowledge.47”

Page 49 (63), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In a concrete experimental setting it showed the new natural philosopher how he was to pro­ ceed in dealing with practical matters of induction, hypothesizing, causal theorizing, and the relating of matters of fact to their ex­ planations.”

Page 55 (69), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “If knowledge was to be empiri-”

Page 56 (70), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “cally based, as Boyle and other English experimentalists insisted it should, then its experimental fo undations had to be witnessed.”

Page 56 (70), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Ex­ perimental performances and their products had to be attested by the testimony of eye witnesses.”

Page 57 (71), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In experimental practice one way of securing the multiplicationof witnesses was to perform experiments in a social space. The experimental “laboratory” was contrasted to the alchemist’s closetprecisely in that the former was said to be a public and the lattera private space.66″

Page 59 (73), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Another important way of multiplying witnesses to experimen­ tally produced phenomena was to facilitate their replication. Ex­ perimental protocols could be reported in such a way as to enable readers of the reports to perform the experiments for themselves, thus ensuring distant but direct witnesses.”

Page 59 (73), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ” replication”

Page 60 (74), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “virtual witnessing. The technology of virtual witnessing involves the production in a reader’s mind of such an image of an experimental scene as obviates the necessity for either direct witness or replica­ tion.79”

Page 60 (74), Highlight (Yellow): Content: “virtual witnessing.”

Page 332 (346), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Hobbes and Boyle proposed radically different solutions to the question of what was to count as knowledge: In so doing, Hobbes and Boyle delineated the nature of the philosophical life, the ways in which it was permissible or obligatory for philos­ ophers to deal with each other, what they were to question and what to take for granted, how their activities were to relate to proceedings in the wider society.”

Page 332 (346), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We con­ clude this book by developing some ideas about the relationships between knowledge and political organization.”

Page 332 (346), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “There are three senses in which we want to say that the historyof science occupies the same terrain as the history of politics. ”

Page 332 (346), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 332 (346), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “First, scientific practitioners have created, selected, and maintained a polity within which they operate and make their intellectual prod­ uct; second, the intellectual product made within that polity has become an element in political activity in the state; third, there is a conditional relationship between the nature of the polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity.”

Page 333 (347), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Our previous usages of terminology such as “experimental space”or “philosophical space” have been twofold: we have referred tospace in an abstract sense, as a cultural domain”

Page 333 (347), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” But we have also, at times, used the notion of space in a physically more concrete sense. The receiver of the air-pump cir­cumscribed such a space, and we have shown the importance at­tached by Boyle to defending the integrity of that space. ”

Page 333 (347), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Yet we want to elaborate some notions concerning a rather larger-scale physical space.”

Page 333 (347), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Philosophy was not the exclusive domain of the professional man. Any such withdrawal into special professional spaces threatened the public status of philosophy.”

Page 333 (347), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Recall Hobbes’s indictment of the Royal Society as yet another restricted professional space.”

Page 333 (347), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We have seen that the ex­ perimentalists also insisted upon the public nature of their activity, but Boyle’s “public” and Hobbes’s “public” were different usages. Hobbes’s philosophy had to be public in the sense that it must not become the preserve of interested professionals.”

Page 334 (348), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In Boyle’s programme there was to be a special space in which experimental natural philosophy was done, in which experiments were performed and witnessed.”

Page 334 (348), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “This was the nascent laboratory.”

Page 336 (350), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The public space insisted upon by experimental philos­ ophers was a space for collective witnessing. We have shown the importance of witnessing for the constitution of the matter of fact.”

Page 336 (350), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “first, the witnessing experience had to be made acces­ sible; second, witnesses had to be reliable and their testimony had to be creditable.”

Page 336 (350), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 336 (350), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “The first condition worked to open up experi­ mental space, while the second acted to restrict entry.”

Page 339 (353), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Hobbesian man differed from Boylean man precisely in the latter’s possession of free will and in the role of that will in constituting knowledge. Hobbesian philosophy did not seek the foundations of knowledge in witnessed and testified mat­ ters of fact: one did not ground philosophy in “dreams.””

Page 340 (354), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ” Through the eight­eenth century one of the most important justifications for the nat­\1ral philosopher’s role was �he spectacular_display of God’s powertn na,lllre. 12 Theologians could come to the place where the Leyden jar operated if they wanted to show cynics the reality of God’smajesty; ”

Page 340 (354), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “natural theologians could come to the astronomer’s ob­ servatory if they wanted evidence of God’s wise and regular ar­ rangements for the order of nature; moralists could come to the natural historian if they wanted socially usable patterns of natural hierarchy, order, and the due submission of ranks.”

Page 342 (356), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We have had three things to connect: (1) the polity of the intel­ lectual community; (2) the solution to the practical problem of making and justifying knowledge; and (3) the polity of the wider society. We have made three connections: we have attempted to show (1) that the solution to the problem of knowledge is political; it is predicated upon laying down rules and conventions of relations between men in the intellectual polity; (2) that the knowledge thus produced and authenticated becomes an element in political action in the wider polity; it is impossible that we should come to under­ stand the nature of political action in the state without referring to the products of the intellectual polity; (3) that the contest among alternative forms of life and their characteristic forms of intellectual product depends upon the political success of the various candi­ dates in insinuating themselves into the activities of other institu­ tions and other interest groups. He who has the most, and the most powerful, allies wins.”

Page 342 (356), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))

Page 344 (358), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “As we come to recognize the conventional and artifactual status of our forms of knowing, we put ourselves in a position to realize that it is ourselves and not reality that is responsible for what we know. Knowledge, as much as the state, is the product of human actions. Hobbes was right.”

Page 413, Underline (Red): Content: “Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, new ed., 11 vols. Paris: Vrin, 1973-1976. Galilei, Galileo. Dialogues concerning Two New Sciences, trans. Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio. New York: Macmillan, 1914; orig. pub!, 1638.”

Page 415, Underline (Red): Content: “Milton, John. Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe et aI., 8 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-1982.”

Page 415, Underline (Red): Content: “Newton, Isaac. The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, ed. H. W. Turnbull,]. D. Scott, A. Rupert Hall, and Laura Tilling, 7 vols. Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press, 1959-1977.”

Page 416, Underline (Red): Content: “Newton, Isaac. Opticks. New York: Dover, 1952; based on 4th ed., London, 1730. —. Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, ed. A. Rupert Hall andMarie Boas Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962. ”

Page 416, Underline (Red): Content: “Pascal, Blaise. Oeuvres completes, ed. Louis Lafuma. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963.”

Page 421, Underline (Red): Content: “Daston, Lorraine J. “The Reasonable Calculus: Classical Probability The­ ory, 1650- 1 840.” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1979·”

Page 422, Underline (Red): Content: “Douglas, Mary. “Self-Evidence,” in idem, Implicit Meanings: Essays in An­ thropology, pp. 276-318. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.”

Page 423, Underline (Red): Content: “Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology oj Knowledge , trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock, 1972. –. “Medicins, juges et sorciers au 17e siecie,” Medecine de France 200 – (1969), 121-128. –. “Questions on Geography,” in idem, Power-Knowledge: Selected In­ – terviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, pp. 63-77. Brighton: Harvester, 1980.”

Page 425, Underline (Red): Content: “Hacking, Ian. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference. Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press, 1975. –. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of – Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.”

Page 429, Underline (Red): Content: “Kuhn, Thomas S. “The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science,” Isis 52 (1961), 161-190. – –. “A Function for Thought Experiments,” in idem, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, pp. 240-265. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.”

Page 429, Underline (Red): Content: “Latour, Bruno. “Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World,” in Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study oj Science, ed. Karin D. Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay, pp. 141-170. London: Sage, 1983.”

Page 430, Underline (Red): Content: “Latour, Bruno. Les microbes: guerre et paix, suivi de irreductions. Paris: Editions A. M. Metailie, 1984. Latour, Bruno, and Woolgar, Steve. Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage, 1979.”

Page 430, Underline (Red): Content: “Leach, Edmund. “Melchisedech and the Emperor: Icons of Subversion and Orthodoxy,” in Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute fo r 1972, pp. 5-14. London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1973.”

Page 431, Underline (Red): Content: “Merton, Robert K. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Inves­ tigations, ed. Norman W. Storer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973·”

Page 435, Underline (Red): Content: “Schaffer, Simon. “Natural Philosophy,” in The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science, ed. G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, pp. 55-91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.”

Page 435, Underline (Red): Content: “(Shapin, Steven. “History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions,” , Hist. Sci. 20 (1982), 157-211. – –. “Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leib­ niz-Clarke Disputes,” Isis 72 (1981), 187-215. Shapin, Steven, and Barnes, Barry. “Head and Hand: Rhetorical Resources in British Pedagogical Writing, 1770- 1 850,” Oxfo rd Rev. Educ. 2 (1976), 231-254.”

Page 439, Underline (Red): Content: “Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and Anscombe. New York: Harper Torch­ books, 1972. –. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil – Blackwell, 1976. –. Preliminary Studies Jor the “Philosophical Investigations, ” Generally – Known as The Blue and Brown Books, 2d ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972. – –. Remarks on the Foundations oJ Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright,”

Page 440, Underline (Red): Content: “R. Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.”

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s