Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England
by Tanya Luhrmann
[Luhrmann, Tanya M. 1991. Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.]
- based on 4 years of participant observation among magicians (Wiccan, Pagan, various occult groups) in London in the 1980s
- “This study looks at ordinary middle-class English people who become immersed in a netherworld of magic and ritual, and asks a classic anthropological question: why do they practise magic when, according to observers, the magic doesn’t work?” (4).
- “Magicians are ordinary, well-educated, usually middle-class people. They are not psychotically deluded, and they are not driven to practise by socioeconomic desperation. By some process, when they get involved with magic—whatever the reasons that sparked their interest—they learn to find it eminently sensible. They learn to accept its core concept: that mind affects matter, and that in special circumstances, like ritual, the trained imagination can alter thephysical world” (7).
- “The real issue is not that magicians become comfortable practising an irrational activity, but that when someone becomes a specialist, he finds his practice progressively more persuasive through the very process of interpreting and making sense of his involvement; this changing understanding may become progressively more opaque to outsiders” (7-8).
- Magical ideas begin to seem normal in the process of becoming a magician: in this way, the involvement is more similar to becoming a certain sort of specialist than to producing a new theory” (312).
- “How can a magician take his ideas seriously? Part of the answer is that the very process of learning to be a magician elicits systematic changes in the way that the magician interprets events. Interpretation depends upon a complex set of assumptions, biases, conceptual frames, knowledge, heuristics and attributive tendencies—intellectual habits in paying attention, in organizing what one notices, and in remembering it” (115).
- “There seem to be three outstanding changes in intellectual habits.
- The magician learns what events count as evidence that the ritual has worked, and begins to find new patterns in sets of events, to see connections where previously he has only seen coincidence.
- Then, he acquires the knowledge shared by fellow practitioners—their common knowledge—which gives a depth and complexity to his practice, and allows him to discriminate between events in new ways, armed with these new categories and distinctions.
- Finally, he begins to use a battery of new assumptions—some of them explicitly formulated, others implicit in the conversation—which alter the types of remarks he takes for granted and does not question. The cumulative effect is as if the magician acquires new spectacles.” (115 numeric points added).
- “I would argue that the rift between magician and non-practitioner is carved out by the very process of becoming a specialist in a particular kind of activity. Becoming a specialist often makes an activity seem sensible. The specialist learns a new way of paying attention to, making sense of and commenting upon her world” (115-16).
- Becoming this type of specialist is important, “But as, if not more, important are the unsystematic experiences which, although they may have little to do with intellectual analysis, make the magician want to justify the practice, and which motivate him in the end to rationalize his commitment. These are the experiences which create bias” (176).
- “Certain aspects of magical practice turn it into an engagement which many practitioners find compelling. They find the rituals deeply moving, the pre-ritual ‘homework’ engrossing, they dream with the images of magic’s potent symbols” (177).
- There are four “distinctive categories of experiential response” to ritual magic practice. (All pg. 179).
- meditation and visualization—”the two techniques which magicians always learn upon becoming involved in practice. These are remarkable techniques: they change the practitioner’s phenomenological experience in relatively well-understood ways, and magicians are notably affected by their use.”
- magician’s language—”the linguistic style with which magicians describe their rituals and meditations. This style evokes a significant imaginative involvement with the ritual’s narrative and gives the magician concrete experience of the abstract terms of magical theory, like ‘contact’ or ‘power’. At the same time, the magician is told that no understanding of magical theory is complete or accurate: she can have confidence that the term refers to something, but she need not state unequivocally what it is.”
- ritual—There are three specific strategies a magician goes through to plan a ritual
- He is concerned to create a separate space and time,
- to exploit mind-altering techniques like chanting,
- and to alter the personality of the ritualist.
- All these techniques take their central task to be setting ritual apart as something different, to be experienced almost as if it involved a different reality superimposed on the everyday.
- symbolism—”The use of symbolism is the most important element of the magician’s magical engagement. Symbolism plays many roles, and evokes many responses, and probably bears most responsibility for magic’s excitement. Magicians invent a mythopoeic history, talk about intimate feelings in symbolic terms, therapeutically reorganize their lives with symbolic ‘archetypes’. They also create a secrecy-shrouded mystery religion and talk of the ‘esoteric knowledge’ which their rites provide.”
- “Throughout all this, the implication should be clear: magic is far more than a theory, and the pleasures of these other aspects—difficult to verbalize, difficult to forget—wed the magician more strongly than any intellectual analysis to a commitment to the validity of his practice” (179).
- So… “Systematic changes in the style of intellectual interpretation make the ideas seem more believable; the satisfactions of involvement make the desire to justify the involvement even greater. Nevertheless, despite magic’s growing appeal, at some point in their practice – for some, throughout their practice – magicians confront scepticism, other people’s or their own” (270).
- “magicians do not produce an elaborate philosophy which would describe all their beliefs, actions and desires as consistent, and substantively rational—oriented towards a genuinely desirable goal in the most effective manner possible. Instead, they justify the inconsistency with a range of arguments and make efforts to separate magic off and make efforts to separate magic off from the mundane by ritual and metaphor. Through practice, theory and styles of arguments, magicians insulate their magic from hostile criticism, real or imagined, and they acquire reasons to explain this separation … People rationalize rather than acting rationally, and strive for local consistency with a patchwork job of post hoc rationalization” (273).
- “people tend to conceptualize themselves as unitary selves, coherent and all-of-a-piece. In order to understand their actions as part of that self, directed towards an end suitable to that self, they talk about ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes’ and ‘desires’, proposition-like assertions which explain why someone performs an action. If you see an aborigine eating grubs, you assume that he believes that the grub is nourishing, delicious, or imbued with sacral power” (307).
- “In order to function effectively, humans—these interpreters of culture—must act as if humans do not act randomly, but in a way they can learn to anticipate and to which they can learn to respond. This involves attributing to them a set of proposition-like assertions about the state of the world – he is carrying an umbrella, he must believe that it will rain this afternoon – which they maintain over time” (307).
“the ethnography presented on modern magic and the persuasiveness which the practice obtains elicits three observations about belief. Let me summarize” (309).
- “First, it is optimistic to think that people have an ordered set of beliefs abouta particular endeavour which forms a consistent set with other beliefs which together describe the totality of thought and action. People are much fuzzier, and more complex, than that. The ethnographer can legitimately identify something like a belief when someone argues for a proposition, at least during the period when they are doing the arguing. But magicians argue in different ways at different times; some of them claim to believe one thing when practising magic, and another thing when not practising magic; others seem to be firmly committed to their practice, and produce arguments about relativism which do not seem entirely plausible in the face of their behaviour. “
- “Second, it is hubris—and bad ethnography—to assume that people act first and foremost because they are motivated by belief. The material on modern magic suggests particularly dearly that people often argue for a belief as a means to legitimize, and even to understand—to rationalize—the practice in which they have been involved … If someone goes to church as a regular part of his life, he is likely to argue for a belief in God. If he feels deeply spiritual when praying to God, he is more likely to be persuaded that God exists, for the religious framework provides a way to interpret that unusual feeling.”
- Third, magicians have beliefs; it is not true that becoming a magician simply involves learning to speak a new ‘language’ … That is more than a bow towards relativism: the assertion claims that apparently strange beliefs say nothing startling, but simply express conventional beliefs in new and surprisingways. Or, the assertion can be that in becoming a shaman, a Scientologist, a believer in something, someone is simply acquiring new terms to describe new experiences” (309).
interpretive drift—slow, often unacknowledged shift in someone’s manner of interpreting events as they become involved with a particular activity. As the newcomer begins to practice, he becomes progressively more skilled at seeing new patterns in events, seeing new sorts of events as significant, paying attention to new patterns … there seems to be a slow, mutual evolution of interpretation and experience, rationalized in a manner which allows the practitioner to practise. The striking feature, I found, was how ad hoc, how seemingly unmotivated, this transformation became. Magicians did not deliberately change the way they thought about the world”
cognitive dissonance—In the fifties, Leon Festinger (and others) developed a sociological theory of ‘cognitive dissonance’ to understand intellectual discomfort. Its most famous application concerned an American flying saucer cult which predicted that the world would end on 21 December. On 22 December—after the prophetic failure—the adherents began to proselytize, for the first time, claiming that the world had been miraculously redeemed. Festinger interpreted this as an attempt to reconcile their considerable commitment to their belief with the embarrassing evidence of its falsity by creating social support for a somewhat transformed version of it” (271).
Continue reading Luhrmann—Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft
Some Problems about Rationality
by Steven Lukes
[Lukes, Steven. 1967. “Some Problems about Rationality.” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie 8 (2): 247–64.]
- A discussion of the question: “when I come across a set of beliefs which appear prima facie irrational, what should be my attitude towards them?
- Should I adopt a critical attitude, taking it as a fact about the beliefs that they are irrational, and seek to explain how they came to be held, how they manage to survive unprofaned by rational criticism, what their consequences are, etc?
- Or should I treat such beliefs charitably: should I begin from the assumption that what appears to me to be irrational may be inter preted as rational when fully understood in its context?
- More briefly, the problem comes down to whether or not there are alternative standards of rationality” (247, bullet points added).
- To answer the question, Lukes;
- distinguishes the different reasons something can be called irrational—”There are, for example, important differences and asymmetries between falsehood, inconsistency and nonsense” (247).
- separates out different criteria of rationality that have become confused by theorists
- attempts to determine which of these criteria are context-dependent and which are universal
- compares five different answers to the initial question (of how to deal with the seemingly irrational).
- when involved in primitive religion and magic, there is no problem, because these beliefs can be seen as purely symbolic.
- “Thus the first answer to our problem amounts to the refusal to answer it, on the grounds that it is nonsensical (Leach), or irrelevant (Firth), or misdirected (Beattie)” (250).
- the rationality of the belief is completely incomprehensible to modern thought. Understanding it would mean “tracing our steps, for many centuries, back into the dim past, far back to the time when we also possessed the mind of primitive man. And the gates have long closed on that hidden road” (Eldon Best qtd, 250).
- Primitive belief systems are an attempt at explaining phenomena, which in itself is a totally rational act that requires rational thought processes.
- This is how Tylor, Frazer, and Evans-Pritchard see things
- Evans-Pritchard breaks it down: “They considered that primitive man had reached his conclusions about the efficacy of magic from rational observation and deduction in much the same way as men ofscience reach their conclusions about natural laws. Underlying all magical ritual is a rational process of thought. The ritual of magic follows from its ideology. It is true that the deductions of a magician are false-had they been true they would have been scientific and not magical-but they are nevertheless based on genuine observation. For classification of phenomena by the similarities which exist between them is theprocedure of science as well as of magic and is the first essential process of human knowledge. Where the magician goes wrong is in inferring that because things arealike in one or more respects they have a mystical link between them whereas in fact the link is not a real link but an ideal connexion in the mind of the magician. [ … ] A causal relationship exists in his mind but not in nature. It is a subjective and not anobjective connexion. Hence the savage mistakes an ideal analogy for a real connexion” (251).
- Durkheim also breaks it down: tis through [primitive religion] that a first explanation of the world has been made possible. [ … ] When I learn that A regularly precedes B, my knowledge is enriched by a new item, but my understanding is not at all satisfied with a statement which does not appear rationally justified. I commence to understand only when it is possible for me to conceive B in a perspective that makes it appear to me as something that is not foreign to A, as united to A by some intelligible relationship. The great service that the religions have rendered to thought is that they have constructed a first representation of what these intelligible relationships between things might be. In the circumstances under which it was attempted, the enterprise could obviously attain only precarious results. But then, does it ever attain any that are definitive, and is it not necessary ceaselessly to reconsider them ? And also, it is less important to succeed than to try. [ … ] The explanations of contemporary science are surer of being objective because they are more methodical and because they rest on more rigorously controlled observations, but they do not differ in nature from those which satisfy primitive thought” (253).
- Emphasize how magical and scientific thinking are fundamentally different,
- magic is prelogical, meaning “not constrained above all else, as ours is, to avoid contradictions. The same logical exigencies are not in its case always present. What to our eyes is impossible or absurd, it sometimes will admit without seeing any difficulty” (254, quoting Lévi-Bruhl).
- The seemingly irrational in primitive societies should simply be seen as rational to those societies
- “According to Winch’s view, when an observer is faced with seemingly irrational beliefs in a primitive society, he should seek contextually given criteria according to which they may appear rational” (255).
- to Evans-Pritchard, in Witchcraft and Oracle Among the Azande, “It is an inevitable conclusion from Zande descriptions of witchcraft that it is not an objective reality. The physiological condition which is said to be the seat of witch craft, and which I believe to be nothing more than food passing through the small intestine, is an objective condition, but the qualities they attribute to it and the rest of their beliefs about it are mystical. Witches, as Azande conceive them, cannot exist” (256).
- Winch has a problem with this because it relies on “objective reality”
- “Beliefs, or sets of beliefs, are said to be irrational if they are inadequate in certain ways:
- if they are illogical, e.g. inconsistent or (self-) contradictory, consisting of or relying on invalid inferences, etc.;
- if they are, partially or wholly, false;
- if they are nonsensical (though it may be questioned whether they would then qualify as propositions and thus as beliefs);
- if they are situationally specific or ad hoc, i.e. : not universalised because bound to particular occasions;
- if the ways in which they come to be held or the manner in which they are held are seen as deficient in some respect” (259, bullet points added).
- (Lukes asserts) some a criteria of rationality are universal, “i.e. relevantly applicable to all beliefs, in any context, while others are context-dependent, i.e. are to be discovered by inves tigating the context and are only relevantly applicable to beliefs in that context” (260).
- for instance if a society “has a language, it must, minimally, possess criteria of truth (as correspondence to reality) and logic, which we share with it and which simply are criteria of rationality” (262).
- He explicitly argues (against Winch): “that beliefs are not only to be evaluated by the criteria that are to be discovered in the context in which they are held; they must also be evaluated by criteria of rationality that simply are criteria of rationality, as opposed to criteria of rationality in context [c]” (260).
- Lukes the goes into a incredibly convoluted process through which he vindicates earlier assertions referring to them as rational (1) [universal] and rational (2) [context-dependent] and confusing everyone.
- In the end, he finds that:
- “One may conclude that all beliefs are to be evaluated by both rational (1) and rational (2) criteria. Sometimes, as in the case of religious beliefs, rational (1) truth criteria will not take the analysis very far. Often rational (1) criteria of logic do not reveal anything positive about relations between beliefs that are to be explicated in terms of “provides a reason for”. Sometimes rational (1) criteria appear less important than “what the situation demands”. In all these cases, rational (2) criteria are illuminating. But they do not make rational (1) criteria dispensable” (264).
- So: “If both sorts of criteria are required for the understanding of beliefs (for they enable us to grasp their truth-conditions and their inter-relations), they are equally necessary to the explanation of why they are held, how they operate and what their social consequences are. Thus only by the application of rational (1) criteria is it possible to see how beliefs which fail to satisfy them can come to be rationally criticised, or fail to be. On the other hand, it is usually only by the application of rational (2) criteria that the point and significance that beliefs have for those that hold them can be grasped. Rational (1) and rational (2) criteria are necessary both to understand and to explain” (264).
Continue reading Lukes—Some Problems about Rationality
When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God
by Tanya Luhrmann
[Luhrmann, Tanya M. 2012. When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God. New York: Vintage Books.]
- Based on over four years of participant observation at Evangelical “Vineyard Christian Fellowship” in Chicago and Northern California.
- trying to find an answer to the “deep puzzle of faith … how sensible, reasonable people, living in more or less the same evidential world as the skeptic, are able to experience themselves as having good evidence for the presence of a powerful invisible being who has demonstrable effect on their lives and are able to sustain a belief in that presence despite their inevitable doubts” (xvi).
- Answer – “In effect, people train the mind in such a way that they experience part of their mind as the presence of God. They learn to reinterpret the familiar experiences of their own minds and bodies as not being their own at all—but God’s” (xxi).
- Vineyard members learn a new theory of mind (participatory) which “asks congregants to experience the mind-world barrier as porous, in a specific, limited way” (40).
- specifically meaning that you can hear things in your mind that did not originate there, but limited to God speaking to you
- The 1960s were a ‘great awakening,’ significantly among the hippie movement in California, which espoused a new, friendly, personal type of Christianity that became evangelism throughout the next decades—which leads to churches like Vineyard
- Vineyards basic view on the God-relationship: “God wants to be your friend; you develop that relationship through prayer; prayer is hard work and requires effort and training; and when you develop that relationship, God will answer back, through thoughts and mental images he places in your mind, and through sensations he causes in your body” (41).
Vineyard members engaged in many practices that trained their minds to work this way
- Figuring out whether or not it is really God is a practice called discernment, based on four tests:
- Is it not something you normally would have said?
- Is it the type of thing you think God might say or imply?
- Is the message confirmed through others’ experiences or larger circumstances?
- Is it followed by a period of peace?
- Another way Vineyard members practice hearing God—pretend you’re hanging out with him
- set an extra place at the table, pour him a cup of coffee, or even have a complete ‘date night’
- with practice, this behavior enacts a type of play that children have with imaginary friends—completely given over to the reality of the pretend, like in Huizinga’s magic circle
- Another type of training is “opening your heart” through emotional practices
- “crying in the presence of God”—be openly emotional when giving or receiving prayer
- “Seeing from God’s perspective”—look at situations past your own limited view
- “practicing love, peace, and joy”—practice it consciously
- “God the therapist”—tell him your problems
- “reworking God the father”—sometimes dads are scary and demanding; God is not
- “emotional cascades”—sudden moments of epiphany, when you physically feel God’s love
- “It is a profoundly social process. It is the evangelical church that teaches discernment, encourages the playI and models the six emotional practices. It is no small matter to become confident that the God you imagine in the privacy of your mind exists externally in the world, talking back. In the struggle to give the invisible being its external presence, the congregation surrounds the individual and helps to hold the being out apart from the self, separate and external. It is the church that confirms that the invisible being is really present, and it is that church that reminds people week after week that the external invisible being loves them, despite all the evidence of the dreary human world. And slowly, the church begins to shape the most private reaches of the way congregants feel and know” (131).
- Vineyard gives classes in prayer and regards some practiced members as “expert prayers”
- These practices are important even to non-believers because “we cannot understand how God becomes real to someone until we understand that a person’s experience of God emerges out of the vortex not only of what they are taught intellectually about God but also of what they do practically to experience God—above all, the way they pray, and what the bring to their prayer experience as unique individuals” (156).
- Vineyard members practice St. Ignatius’s “Spiritual Exercises”— training the imagination to picture the imaginer as a part of the life of Jesus
So how does this work?
- Luhrmann says that the congregants who have the more intense experiences and the most verbal relationship with God have high rates of the absorption personality trait.
- when you get absorbed in something, it seems more real to you, and you and your world seem different than before. That is why it is related to hypnotizability. Both rely upon your ability to throw yourself into something and then to involve yourself intensely in the experience” (199).
- This gave her a hypothesis: “that when people believe that God will speak to them through their senses, when they have a propensity for absorption, and when they are trained in absorption by the practice of prayer, these people will report what prayer experts report: internal sensory experiences with sharper mental imagery and more sensory overrides (sensory experience in the absence of sensory stimuli). Note the combination: an interest in interpreting a supernatural presence (the participatory theory of mind, taught by the social world of the church); a willingness to get caught up in one’s imagination (an individual difference); and actual practice ( they do something again and again, which has consequences)” (202).
- So she tested it in Northern California by having subjects listen to training tapes for 30 minutes every day for a month.
- She found that the subjects “entered the project with a broad, generic desire to hear God speak or perhaps just to get their prayer life moving again; they spent thirty minutes a day imaginatively immersed in the scriptures; and then they had unplanned idiosyncratic experiences that they saw with their eyes and heard with their ears” (216).
evangelical—based in three beliefs: literal truth of the Bible, one can be saved through a personal relationship with Jesus (being “born again”), and one should spread the gospel
absorption—the mental capacity common to trance, hypnosis, dissociation, and to most imaginative experiences in which the individual becomes caught up in ideas or images or fascinations. That is not to say that absorption is equivalent to hypnosis or dissociation or trance: manifestly it is not. But absorption seems to be the basic, necessary skill, the shared capacity of mind that allows what we choose to attend lo become more salient than the everyday context in which we arc embedded. It is the ability to use a book to take your mind off your troubles. That cuts both ways, of course. Some people use novels to keep the world at bay long enough to recover and regain the strength to return. Others use novels-or soap operas, or reality television-to escape and ignore the troubled marriage or the needy child. In both cases, individuals use their mind to change their relation to the reality they perceive … That is why absorption is central to spirituality. The capacity to treat what the mind imagines as more real than the world one knows is the capacity at the heart of experience of God” (201).
“How Edge Are You?” Constructing Authentic Identities and Subcultural Boundaries in a Straightedge Internet Forum
by J. Patrick Williams & Heith Copes
[Williams, J. Patrick, and Heith Copes. ““How edge are you?” Constructing authentic identities and subcultural boundaries in a straightedge internet forum.”Symbolic Interaction 28, no. 1 (2005): 67-89.]
- based on several years of online participant (and non-participant) observation on an Internet forum catering to the Straightedge community
- good section on methodology of subcultural social media study
- Uses Fine and Kleinman’s (1979) concept of communication interlocks, describing the way subcultures’ influence spreads to other areas. These work in four ways:
- members of a subculture are simultaneously members of multiple networks
- this involves maintaining weak social ties with many other people, so some subcultural info moves past subcultural boundaries
- some subculturists hold key structural roles (representatives, musicians, etc.) and spread cultural information officially through outside structures (fans).
- The mass media spreads information back and forth across subcultural boundaries, introducing nonmembers to the subculture through journalistic exposés or a subcultural music style finding mainstream success
- articles argues against Fine and Kleinman, who assert that self-identification is a necessary part of Subcultural membership
- Instead, the Internet “facilitates subcultural diffusion via nomadic internet users who may share subcultural values and feel a part of a virtual community but who do not feel the need to self-identify as subcultural members” (86).
- Thus, Internet forums can be seen as a new communication interlock, lying between face-to-face interaction and mass media communication
- acting as an example of the general ‘postmodern condition,’ characterized by “the fragmentation of identity and the weakening of commitment to anything but oneself” (86).
straightedge—a subculture that mixes punk music and aesthetics with a non-drug/alcohol/sex lifestyle
We analyze how participants in an internet forum dedicated to the straightedge subculture articulate and express subcultural identities and boundaries, with particular attention to how they accomplish these tasks in a computer-mediated context. Through participant observation, “focused discussions,” and interviews, we explore the complexity of identity-making processes in terms of cyberspace and subculture, conceptualizing identification as occurring at the intersection of biography, subculture, and technology. We find that the internet influences how individuals participate in subcultural communities by analyzing their claims for authenticity and how they position themselves in relation to subcultural boundaries. This article provides insight into the dialectic relationship between participation in a subculture and in an internet community. Continue reading Williams & Copes—How Edge Are You?
The Beast Within, Anthrozoomorphic Identity and Alternative Spirituality in the Online Therianthropy Movement
by Venetia Laura Delano Robertson
[Robertson, Venetia Laura Delano. 2013. “The Beast Within: Anthrozoomorphic Identity and Alternative Spirituality in the Online Therianthropy Movement.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 16 (3): 7–30.]
- Therians (along with Real Vampires and Otherkin) are part of the postmodern project of re-enchanting the West
- The Internet provides a perfect space for this re-enchantment, as it affords all of the necessary elements of what Christopher Partridge calls popular occulture—”a melting pot of Paganism, Esotericism, Jungian psychology, folk medicine, modern superstitions, and paranormal theories” (8).
- Also, “the hypermediacy of cyberspace promotes the appropriation of spiritual concepts into“open-source” belief systems, such as Neopaganism, that advocate creativity and individualism” (9).
- “Therians believe they have non-human (hence super-human) souls, unique metaphysical properties and abilities (animal-human auras, shape-shifting capabilities, memories of past lives), and are immersed in the language of magic; hence, constructing a Therian identity is indicative of new modes of self-sacralization” (11).
- breaks down the “tenets” of therianthropy: internally based experience; awakenings; and shifting (mental, phantom, and physical).
- “Though it is not religious in the traditional sense, Therianthropy is an eclectic ontological position system that draws upon myth, magic, and both main- stream and subcultural media to reify a self that is other-than-human” (24).
This paper will introduce a little-known online phenomenon: the socio-spiritual Therianthropy movement. Therianthropes are individuals who identify as part human and part non-human animal in a biological, mental, and metaphysical capacity. Therianthropes have, in essence, an anthrozoomorphic identity that draws upon the spiritual and supernatural associations of the animal kingdom. I discuss Therianthropes as animal-human “shape-shifters” to highlight the sacred and liminal identity these individuals have formulated through their engagement with “popular occulture.” Therianthropy, as both a web-based community and an identity, exemplifies the postmodern bent of new spiritual directions in the re-enchanted West. KEYWORDS: Therianthropy, animal, shape-shifting, identity, popular occulture” Continue reading Robertson—The Beast Within
The Law of the Jungle: Self and Community in the Online Therianthropy Movement
by Venetia Laura Delano Robertson
[Robertson, Venetia Laura Delano. 2012. “The Law of the Jungle: Self and Community in the Online Therianthropy Movement.” Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies 14 (2).]
- Therianthropy exists as part of a larger occultic miliieu – which “encompasses superstition, folklore, the New Age, popular culture, conspiracy theories, and Jungian theory, to name only a few ingredients in this spiritual melting pot” (259).
- Describes in detail the beginnings of AHWW
- Includes a discussion of grilling—“the process of interrogating and challenging new members to ensure that they sub- scribe to the accepted view of Therianthropy and will therefore be serious contributors to the community” (269).
- Frames Therianthropy as liminal in nature
- Doesn’t seem to think an anthropology of Therians would be possible
The Therianthropy community is comprised of individuals who profess an other-than-human identity, in particular an animal identity. Existing almost solely online, this socio-spiritual identity group experiences tensions between the individual and personal gnosis, and the community and communal consensus, when it comes to evincing the epistemologies, that is, knowledges and ways of knowing concerning Therianthropy. By examining how themes of authority, belonging, and both group and self-acceptance are played out in the discourse and activity of this movement, implicit modes of initiation and rites of passage can be envisaged. These modes are vital for the success of this movement, as they continuously solidify a sense of group and individual identity through the clear designation of an in- and out- group. Yet, the Therianthrope is held up as a liminal figure, an other than human being who resides in a sacred, interstitial state. This is the essence of what is thought to separate Therianthropes from other humans, and what makes this identity group a challenge to traditional conceptions of initiation and rites of passage. Keywords: animal-human; identity; online community; other-than-human; Therianthropy.” Continue reading Robertson—The Law of the Jungle
Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State
by Michael Herzfeld
[Herzfeld, Michael. 2005. Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. 2 edition. New York: Routledge.]
- big question = “what advantages [do] social actors find in using, reformulating, and recasting official idioms in the pursuit of often highly unofficial personal goals, and how [do] these actions—so often in direct contravention of state authority—actually constitute the state as well as a huge range of national and other identities” (2).
- “the nation-state’s claims to affixed, eternal identity grounded in universal truth are themselves, like the moves of all social actors, strategic adjustments to the demands of the historical moment” (5).
- KEY POINT (acc. to Herzfeld) = the idea of the polity—nation-state, local community, or international body—succeeds to the extent that its formal ideology encapsulates (or incorporates) all the inward flaws and imperfections to which it is officially and ostensibly opposed” (220).
- Anthropologists should adopt the combination of a “top down” and “bottom up” approach, located at what Herzfeld calls a “militant middle ground.” This ground is not only a space where cultural intimacy and its use/characteristics are taken into consideration as coming equally from the state and the individuals, but also a space wherein the anthropologists takes a stance of cultural relativism, while maintaining their own personal ethical and moral beliefs (taking action if deemed necessary).
- To shrug off binarism as a structuralist conceit is a mistake. Binarism and other essentialism play important parts of social life, and thus should be embraced by ethnography. It is important to note, however, that these binarisms act as convenient ways of describing the world, and should not be used as or confused with an abstract theoretical position.
cultural intimacy—”the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality, the familiarity with the bases of power that may at one moment assure the disenfranchised a degree of creative irreverence and at the next moment reinforce the effectiveness of intimidation” (3)
disemia—”the formal or coded tension between official self-presentation and what goes on in the privacy of collective introspection” (14).
structural nostalgia—”the longing for an age before the state, for the primordial and self regulating birthright that the state continually invoke” (22). Continue reading Herzfeld—Cultural Intimacy