How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human
by Eduardo Kohn
[Kohn, Eduardo. 2013. How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human. Berkeley: University of California Press.]
Points
“How other kinds of beings see us matters. Th at other kinds of beings see us changes things. If jaguars also represent us—in ways that can matter vitally to us—then anthropology cannot limit itself just to exploring how people from different societies might happen to represent them as doing so” (1).
“This book is an attempt to ponder the Sphinx’s riddle by attending ethnographically to a series of Amazonian other-than-human encounters. Attending to our relations with those beings that exist in some way beyond the human forces us to question our tidy answers about the human. Th e goal here is neither to do away with the human nor to reinscribe it but to open it. In rethinking the human we must also rethink the kind of anthropology that would be adequate to this task. Sociocultural anthropology in its various forms as it is practiced today takes those attributes that are distinctive to humans—language, culture, society, and history—and uses them to fashion the tools to understand humans. In this process the analytical object becomes isomorphic with the analytics. As a result we are not able to see the myriad ways in which people are connected to a broader world of life, or how this fundamental connection changes what it might mean to be human. And this is why expanding ethnography to reach beyond the human is so important. An ethnographic focus not just on humans or only on animals but also on how humans and animals relate breaks open the circular closure that otherwise confines us when we seek to understand the distinctively human by means of that which is distinctive to humans” (6).
“I seek to contribute to these posthuman critiques of the ways in which we have treated humans as exceptional—and thus as fundamentally separate from the rest of the world—by developing a more robust analytic for understanding human relations to nonhuman beings. I do so by refl ecting on what it might mean to say that forests think. I do so, that is, by working out the connection between representational processes (which form the basis for all thought) and living ones as this is revealed through ethno-graphic attention to that which lies beyond the human. I use the insights thus gained to rethink our assumptions about the nature of representation, and I then explore how this rethinking changes our anthropological concepts. I call this approach an “anthropology beyond the human” (7).
“But symbols, those kinds of signs that are based on convention (like the English word dog), which are distinctively human representational forms, and whose properties make human language possible, actually emerge from and relate to other modalities of representation. In Peirce’s terminology these other modalities (in broad terms) are either “iconic” (involving signs that share likenesses with the things they represent) or “indexical” (involving signs that are in some way affected by or otherwise correlated with those things they represent). In addition to being symbolic creatures we humans share these other semiotic modalities with the rest of nonhuman biological life (Deacon 1997) … though signs may be extralinguistic (with the consequence that language can be treated as something more than symbolic) the contexts that make them meaningful are human sociocultural ones” (8).
“Life is constitutively semiotic” (9).
“This way of understanding semiosis can help us move beyond a dualistic approach to anthropology, in which humans are portrayed as separate from the worlds they represent, toward a monistic one, in which how humans represent jaguars and how jaguars represent humans can be understood as integral, though not interchangeable, parts of a single, open-ended story” (9).
“In sum, an anthropology beyond the human is perforce an ontological one. That is, taking nonhumans seriously makes it impossible to confine our anthropological inquiries to an epistemological concern for how it is that humans, at some particular time or in some particular place, go about making sense of them. As an ontological endeavor this kind of anthropology places us in a special position to rethink the sorts of concepts we use and to develop new ones. In Marilyn Strathern’s words, it aims “to create the conditions for new thoughts” (1988: 20)” (10).
“My argument is that we are colonized by certain ways of thinking about relationality. We can only imagine the ways in which selves and thoughts might form associations through our assumptions about the forms of associations that structure human language. And then, in ways that often go unnoticed, we project these assumptions onto nonhumans. Without realizing it we attribute to nonhumans properties that are our own, and then, to compound this, we narcissistically ask them to provide us with corrective reflections of ourselves … Forests are good to think because they themselves think. Forests think. I want to take this seriously, and I want to ask, What are the implications of this claim for our understandings of what it means to be human in a world that extends beyond us?” (21-22).
“Signs don’t come from the mind. Rather, it is the other way around. What we call mind, or self, is a product of semiosis. Th at “somebody,” human or non-human, who takes the crashing palm to be significant is a “self that is just com-ing into life in the fl ow of time” (CP 5.421) by virtue of the ways in which she comes to be a locus—however ephemeral—for the “interpretance” of this sign and many others like it. In fact, Peirce coined the cumbersome term interpretant to avoid the “homunculus fallacy” (see Deacon 2012: 48) of seeing a self as a sort of black box (a little person inside us, a homunculus) who would be the interpreter of those signs but not herself the product of those signs. Selves, human or nonhuman, simple or complex, are outcomes of semiosis as well as the starting points for new sign interpretation whose outcome will be a future self. They are waypoints in a semiotic process” (34).
“We need to provincialize language because we conflate representation with language and this conflation finds its way into our theory. We universalize this distinctive human propensity by first assuming that all representation is some-thing human and then by supposing that all representation has language like properties” (39).
“To summarize: signs are not exclusively human affairs. All living beings sign. We humans are therefore at home with the multitude of semiotic life. Our exceptional status is not the walled compound we thought we once inhabited. An anthropology that focuses on the relations we humans have with nonhuman beings forces us to step beyond the human. In the process it makes what we’ve taken to be the human condition—namely, the paradoxical, and “provincialized,” fact that our nature is to live immersed in the “unnatural” worlds we construct—appear a little strange. Learning how to appreciate this is an important goal of an anthropology beyond the human” (42).
“Thinking with images, as I do here with the Sphinx’s riddle, and as I do throughout this book, with all kinds of images—be they oneiric, aural, anecdotal, mythic, or even photographic (there are other stories being “told” here without words)—and learning to attend to the ways in which these images amplify, and thus render apparent, something about the human via that which lies beyond the human, is, as I’ve been arguing, also a way of opening ourselves to the distinctive iconic logics of how the forest’s thoughts might think their ways through us. How Forests Think aims to think like forests: in images” (222).
Annotation Summar for: Kohn – How Forests Think
Page iv (5), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “2013”
Page iv (5), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “How forests think : toward an anthropology beyond the human / Eduardo Kohn.”
Page 1 (16), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Juanicu warned me, “Sleep faceup! If a jaguar comes he’ll see you can look back at him and he won’t bother you. If you sleep facedown he’ll think you’re aicha [prey; lit., “meat” in Quichua] and he’ll attack.” If, Juanicu was saying, a jaguar sees you as a being capable of looking back—a self like himself, a you—he’ll leave you alone. But if he should come to see you as prey—an it—you may well become dead meat.”
Page 1 (16), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “How other kinds of beings see us matters. Th at other kinds of beings see us changes things. If jaguars also represent us—in ways that can matter vitally to us—then anthropology cannot limit itself just to exploring how people from diff erent societies might happen to represent them as doing so. ”
Page 1 (16), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 1 (16), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Such encoun- ters with other kinds of beings force us to recognize the fact that seeing, rep- resenting, and perhaps knowing, even thinking, are not exclusively human aff airs.”
Page 1 (16), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “How would coming to terms with this realization change our understand- ings of society, culture, and indeed the sort of world that we inhabit? How does it change the methods, scope, practice, and stakes of anthropology? And, more important, how does it change our understanding of anthropology’s object—the “human”—given that in that world beyond the human we some- times fi nd things we feel more comfortable attributing only to ourselves?”
Page 2 (17), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “So as not to become meat we must return the jaguar’s gaze. But in this encounter we do not remain unchanged. We become something new, a new kind of “we” perhaps, aligned somehow with that predator who regards us as a pred-ator and not, fortunately, as dead meat. ”
Page 2 (17), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e forests are full of runa puma, shape-shifting human-jaguars, or were-jaguars as I will call them.”
Page 2 (17), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Runa in Quichua means “person”; puma means “predator” or “jaguar.” Th ese runa puma—beings who can see themselves being seen by jaguars as fellow predators, and who also sometimes see other humans the way jaguars do, namely, as prey”
Page 2 (17), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I was cautioned. “Be especially wary oftheir drinking parties. When you go out to pee you might come back to fi nd that your hosts have become jaguars.” ”
Page 3 (18), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th ey are, and, as they invariably make clear, have always been Runa—literally, “human persons”—which for them means that they have always been Christian and “civilized.””
Page 3 (18), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “contradictions—that Runa shamans receive messages from Chris- tian gods and that the were-jaguars that wander the forests around Ávila are white—are part of what drew me to Ávila. Th e Ávila Runa are far removed from any image of a pristine or wild Amazon. Th eir world—their very being— is thoroughly informed by a long and layered colonial history.”
Page 3 (18), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “And yet they also live intimately with all kinds of real jaguars that walk the forests around Ávila; these include those that are white, those that are Runa, and those that are decidedly spotted.”
Page 5 (20), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Eating also brings people in intimate relation to the many other kinds of nonhuman beings that make the forest their home.”
Page 5 (20), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Getting food through hunting, fi shing, gathering, gardening, and the management of a vari- ety of ecological assemblages involves people intimately with one of the most complex ecosystems in the world—one that is chock-full of an astounding array of diff erent kinds of interacting and mutually constituting beings.”
Page 6 (21), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is book is an attempt to ponder the Sphinx’s riddle by attending ethno-graphically to a series of Amazonian other-than-human encounters. Attending to our relations with those beings that exist in some way beyond the human forces us to question our tidy answers about the human. Th e goal here is neither to do away with the human nor to reinscribe it but to open it. In rethinking the human we must also rethink the kind of anthropology that would be adequate to this task. Sociocultural anthropology in its various forms as it is practiced today takes those attributes that are distinctive to humans—language, culture, society, and history—and uses them to fashion the tools to understand humans. In this process the analytical object becomes isomorphic with the analytics. As a result we are not able to see the myriad ways in which people are connected to a broader world of life, or how this fundamental connection changes what it might mean to be human. And this is why expanding ethnography to reach beyond the human is so important. An ethnographic focus not just on humans or only on animals but also on how humans and animals relate breaks open the circular closure that otherwise confi nes us when we seek to understand the distinctively human by means of that which is distinctive to humans.”
Page 6 (21), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 6 (21), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Creating an analytical framework that can include humans as well as non- humans has been a central concern of science and technology studies (see esp.”
Page 7 (22), Underline (Red): Content: “Latour 1993, 2005), Haraway 2008; (Deleuze and Guattari 1987)”
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Latour 1993, 2005), the “multispecies” or animal turn (see esp. Haraway 2008; Mullin and Cassidy 2007; Choy et al. 2009; see also Kirksey and Helmreich 2010 for a review), and Deleuze-infl uenced (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) scholarship (e.g., Bennett 2010).”
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Along with these approaches I share the fun-damental belief that social science’s greatest contribution—the recognition and delimitation of a separate domain of socially constructed reality—is also its greatest curse. Along with these I also feel that fi nding ways to move beyond this problem is one of the most important challenges facing critical thought today. And I have especially been swayed by Donna Haraway’s conviction thatthere is something about our everyday engagements with other kinds of crea-tures that can open new kinds of possibilities for relating and understanding. ”
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “ese “posthumanities” have been remarkably successful at focusing on the zone beyond the human as a space for critique and possibility. However, their productive conceptual engagement with this zone is hampered by certain assumptions, shared with anthropology and social theory more broadly, con- cerning the nature of representation. Furthermore, in attempting to address some of the diffi culties these assumptions about representation create, they tend to arrive at reductionistic solutions that fl atten important distinctions between humans and other kinds of beings, as well as those between selves and objects.”
Page 7 (22), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I seek to contribute to these posthuman critiques of the ways in which we have treated humans as exceptional—and thus as funda-mentally separate from the rest of the world—by developing a more robust analytic for understanding human relations to nonhuman beings. I do so by refl ecting on what it might mean to say that forests think. I do so, that is, by working out the connection between representational processes (which form the basis for all thought) and living ones as this is revealed through ethno-graphic attention to that which lies beyond the human. I use the insights thus gained to rethink our assumptions about the nature of representation, and I then explore how this rethinking changes our anthropological concepts. I call this approach an “anthropology beyond the human.””
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““anthropology beyond the human.””
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In this endeavor I draw on the work of the nineteenth-century philosopher Charles Peirce (1931, 1992a, 1998a), especially his work in semiotics (the study of how signs represent things in the world).”
Page 7 (22), Underline (Red): Content: “Charles Peirce (1931, 1992a, 1998a),”
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Yellow): Content: “semiotics”
Page 7 (22), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the “weird” Peirce, those aspects of Peirce’s writing that we anthro- pologists fi nd hard to digest—those parts that reach beyond the human to situate representation in the workings and logics of a broader nonhuman”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “universe out of which we humans come.”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e fi rst step toward understanding how forests think is to discard our received ideas about what it means to represent something.”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Contrary to our assumptions, representation is actually something more than conventional, linguistic, and symbolic. is more expansive understanding of representation is hard to appre- ciate because our social theory—whether humanist or posthumanist, struc- turalist or poststructuralist—confl ates representation with language.”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “in the sense that we tend to think of how representation works in terms of our assumptions about how human language works. Because linguistic representation is based on signs that are con-ventional, systemically related to one another, and “arbitrarily” related to their objects of reference, we tend to assume that all representational processes havethese properties.”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “But symbols, those kinds of signs that are based on convention (like the English word dog), which are distinctively human representational forms, and whose properties make human language possible, actually emerge from and relate to other modalities of representation. In Peirce’s terminology these other modalities (in broad terms) are either “iconic” (involving signs that share likenesses with the things they represent) or “indexical” (involving signs that are in some way aff ected by or otherwise correlated with those things they represent).”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ” “iconic” ”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““indexical””
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In addition to being symbolic creatures we humans share these other semiotic modalities with the rest of nonhuman biological life (Deacon 1997).”
Page 8 (23), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “though signs may be extralinguistic (with the conse- quence that language can be treated as something more than symbolic) the contexts that make them meaningful are human sociocultural ones”
Page 9 (24), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Life is constitutively semiotic.”
Page 9 (24), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “What we share with nonhuman living creatures, then, is not our embodiment, as certain strains of phenome- nological approaches would hold, but the fact that we all live with and through signs.”
Page 9 (24), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is way of understanding semiosis can help us move beyond a dualistic approach to anthropology, in which humans are portrayed as separate from the worlds they represent, toward a monistic one, in which how humans rep- resent jaguars and how jaguars represent humans can be understood as inte- gral, though not interchangeable, parts of a single, open-ended story.”
Page 9 (24), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is search for a better way to attend to our relations to that which lies beyond the human, especially that part of the world beyond the human that is alive, forces us to make ontological claims—claims, that is, about the nature of reality.”
Page 9 (24), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “insights that are garnered from attention to engage-ments with nonhumans and that are thus not fully circumscribed by any par-ticular human system of understanding them.”
Page 10 (25), Underline (Red): Content: “(Venkatesan et al. 2010)”
Page 10 (25), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “As a recent debate makes clear (Venkatesan et al. 2010), ontology, as it cir- culates in our discipline, is a thorny term. On the one hand, it is often nega- tively associated with a search for ultimate truths—the kinds that the ethno- graphic documentation of so many diff erent ways of doing and seeing is so good at debunking (Carrithers 2010: 157). On the other hand, it sometimes seems to function as nothing more than a trendy word for culture, especially when a possessive pronoun precedes it: our ontology, say, versus theirs (Hol- braad 2010: 180).”
Page 10 (25), Note (Orange): Ontology
Page 10 (25), Underline (Red): Content: “Philippe Descola Eduardo Viveiros de Castro,”
Page 10 (25), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Philippe Descola Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Th eir work has gained traction in anthropology because of the ways it renders ontology plural without turning it into culture: diff erent worlds instead of diff er-ent worldviews (Candea 2010: 175).”
Page 10 (25), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I ask, What kinds of insights about the nature of the world become apparent when we attend to certain engagements with parts of that world thatreveal some of its diff erent entities, dynamics, and properties? ”
Page 10 (25), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In sum, an anthropology beyond the human is perforce an ontological one.”
Page 10 (25), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th at is, taking nonhumans seriously makes it impossible to confi ne our anthropological inquiries to an epistemological concern for how it is that humans, at some particular time or in some particular place, go about making sense of them. As an ontological endeavor this kind of anthropology places us in a special position to rethink the sorts of concepts we use and to develop new ones. In Marilyn Strathern’s words, it aims “to create the conditions for new thoughts” (1988: 20).”
Page 10 (25), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 14 (29), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is book will not immediately plunge you into the messy entangled, “natural-cultural” worlds (Latour 1993) whose witnessing has come to be the hallmark of anthropological approaches to nonhumans. Rather, it seeks a gentler immersion in a kind of thinking that grows. It begins with very simple matters so that complexity, context, and entanglement can themselves become the objects of ethnographic analysis rather than the unquestioned conditions for it.”
Page 14 (29), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is book, attempts to develop an analytic, which seeks to take anthropology “beyond the human” but without losing sight of the pressing ways in which we are also “all too human,” and how this too bears on living. ”
Page 15 (30), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e fi rst chapter, constitutes a sort of ethnography of signs beyond the human. It undertakes an ethnographic exploration of how humans and nonhumans use signs that are not necessarily symbolic—that is, signs that are not conventional—and demonstrates why these signs cannot be fully cir- cumscribed by the symbolic.”
Page 15 (30), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th ose concerned with nonhumans have often tried to overcome the famil- iar Cartesian divide between the symbolic realm of human meanings and the meaningless realm of objects either by mixing the two—terms such as natures- cultures or material-semiotic are indicative of this—or by reducing one of these poles to the other. By contrast, “Th e Open Whole” aims to show that the rec- ognition of representational processes as something unique to, and in a sense”
Page 15 (30), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““Th e Open Whole””
Page 16 (31), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “even synonymous with, life allows us to situate distinctively human ways of being in the world as both emergent from and in continuity with a broader living semiotic realm.”
Page 16 (31), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Chapter 2, “Th e Living Th ought,” considers the implications of the claim, laidout in chapter 1, that all beings, including those that are nonhuman, are consti-tutively semiotic. All life is semiotic and all semiosis is alive.”
Page 16 (31), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In important ways, then, life and thought are one and the same: life thinks; thoughts are alive.”
Page 16 (31), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is has implications for understanding who “we” are. Wherever there are “living thoughts” there is also a “self.” “Self,” at its most basic level, is a product of semiosis.”
Page 16 (31), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “A focus on this living semiotic dynamic in which indistinction (not to be con- fused with intrinsic similarity) operates also helps us see how “kinds” emerge”
Page 16 (31), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““kinds””
Page 17 (32), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “in the world beyond the human. Kinds are not just human mental categories, be these innate or conventional; they result from how beings relate to each other in an ecology of selves in ways that involve a sort of confusion.”
Page 17 (32), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Chapter 3, “Soul Blindness,” is about the general problem of how death is intrinsic to life.”
Page 17 (32), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Hunting, fi shing, and trapping place the Runa in a particular relationship with the many beings that make up the ecology of selves in which they live. Th ese activities force the Runa to assume their points of view, and indeed to recognize that all these creatures that they hunt, as well as the many other creatures with which those hunted animals relate, have points of view.”
Page 17 (32), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e Runa enter the forest’s ecology of selves in order to hunt, which means that they recognize others as selves like them- selves in order to turn them into nonselves. Objectifi cation, then, is the fl ipside of animism, and it is not a straightforward process.”
Page 18 (33), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Chapter 4, “Trans-Species Pidgins,” is the second of these two chaptersconcerned with the challenges posed by living in relation to so many kinds of selves in this vast ecology of selves. It focuses on the problem of how to safely and successfully communicate with the many kinds of beings that people the cosmos.”
Page 18 (33), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “How to understand and be understood by beings whose grasp of human language is constantly in question is diffi cult in its own right. And when successful, communication with these beings can be destabilizing.”
Page 18 (33), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Much of this chapter focuses on the semiotic analysis of human attempts to understand and be understood by their dogs. For example, people in Ávila struggle to interpret their dogs’ dreams, and they even give their dogs halluci- nogens in order to be able to give them advice—in the process shifting to a sort of trans-species pidgin with unexpected properties.”
Page 19 (34), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “How the Runa relate to their dogs, to the living creatures of the forest, to its ethereal but real spirits, and to the various other fi gures—the estate bosses, the priests, the colonists—that over the course of time have come to people their world cannot be distentangled.”
Page 19 (34), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th ey are all part of this ecology that makes the Runa who they are. Nonetheless, I resist the temptation to treat this relational knot as an irreducible complexity. Th ere is something we can learn about all these relations—and relationality more broadly—by paying careful attention to the specifi c modalities through which communication is attempted with diff erent kinds of beings. ”
Page 19 (34), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th ese struggles to communicate reveal certain formal properties of relation—a certain logic of association, a set of constraints—that are neither the contingent products of earthly biolo- gies nor those of human histories but which are instantiated in, and thus give shape to, both.”
Page 19 (34), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Projecting our morality, which rightfully privileges equality, on a rela- tional landscape composed in part of nested and unidirectional associations of a logical and ontological, but not a moral, nature is a form of anthropocentric narcissism that renders us blind to some of the properties of that world beyond the human. As a consequence it makes us incapable of harnessing them politi- cally. Part of the interest of this chapter, then, lies in charting how such nested relations get caught up and deployed in moral worlds without themselves being the products of those moral worlds.”
Page 19 (34), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e fi fth chapter, “Form’s Eff ortless Effi cacy,” is the place where I fl esh out this account—to which I have heretofore been alluding—of the anthropo-logical signifi cance of form. Th at is, it is about how specifi c confi gurations of limits on possibility emerge in this world, the peculiar manner in which these redundancies propagate, and the ways in which they come to matter to lives, human and otherwise, in the forests around Ávila.”
Page 20 (35), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is chapter, seeks to further this endeavor by going beyond not only the human but also life.”
Page 20 (35), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “It is about the strange properties of pattern propagation that exceed life despite the fact that such patterns are harnessed, nurtured, and amplifi ed by life.”
Page 20 (35), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “By “form” here, I’m not, then, referring to the conceptual structures—innate or learned—through which we humans apprehend the world, nor am I refer-ring to an ideal Platonic realm. Rather, I am referring to a strange but nonethe-less worldly process of pattern production and propagation, a process Deacon (2006, 2012) characterizes as “morphodynamic”—one whose peculiar genera-tive logic necessarily comes to permeate living beings (human and nonhuman) as they harness it. ”
Page 21 (36), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e wealth of the forest— be it game or extractive commodities—accumulates in a patterned way. Accessing it requires fi nding ways to enter the logic of these patterns. Accord- ingly, this chapter also charts the various techniques, shamanic and otherwise, used to do this, and it also attends to the painful sense of alienation the Runa feel when they are unable to enter the many new forms that have come over time to serve as the reservoirs for so much power and wealth.”
Page 21 (36), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “My argument is that we are colonized by certain ways of thinking about relationality.”
Page 21 (36), Underline (Blue): Content: “My argument is that we are colonized by certain ways of thinking about relationality.”
Page 21 (36), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “we are colonized by certain ways of thinking about relationality. We can onlyimagine the ways in which selves and thoughts might form associations through our assumptions about the forms of associations that structure human language. And then, in ways that often go unnoticed, we project these assumptions onto nonhumans. Without realizing it we attribute to nonhu-mans properties that are our own, and then, to compound this, we narcissisti-cally ask them to provide us with corrective refl ections of ourselves. ”
Page 21 (36), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 21 (36), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Forests are good to think because they themselves think. Forests think. I want to take this seriously, and”
Page 22 (37), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I want to ask, What are the implications of this claim for our understandings of what it means to be human in a world that extends beyond us?”
Page 23 (38), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e fi nal chapter, “Th e Living Future (and the Imponderable Weight of the Dead),” builds on this way of thinking with forests that I develop in this book as it takes as its focus another enigmatic dream, in this case one of a hunter who is not sure if he is the rapacious predator (who appears here as a white policeman)or the helpless prey of his oneiric prophecy. ”
Page 24 (39), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Chapter 6, then, is primarily concerned with one particular manifestation of this future: the realm of the afterlife located deep in the forest and inhabited by the dead and the spirit masters that control the forest’s animals. Th is realm is the product of the relationship that invisible futures have to the painful histories of the dead that make life possible.”
Page 25 (40), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th at hunter’s challenge of surviving as an I, as it was revealed in his dream and as it plays out in this ecology of selves, depends on how he is hailed by others—others that may be human or nonhuman, fl eshly or virtual. It also depends on how he responds. Is he the white policeman who might turn on his Runa neighbors with a blood thirst that terrifi es him? Is he helpless prey? Or might he not be a runa puma, a were-jaguar, capable, even, of returning a jaguar’s gaze? ”
Page 27 (42), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “ONE The Open Whole”
Page 31 (46), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th e palm crashing down stands for something to the monkey. Sig- nifi cance is not the exclusive province of humans because we are not the only ones who interpret signs. Th e crashing palm itself comes to signify something for the monkey in another capacity. Th e crash, as sign, is not a likeness of the object it represents. Instead, it points to something else. Peirce calls this sort of sign an “index.” Indices constitute his second broad class of signs.”
Page 31 (46), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““index.””
Page 31 (46), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “further, I want to briefl y introduce the “symbol”— Peirce’s third kind of sign.”
Page 31 (46), Highlight (Yellow): Content: ““symbol”—”
Page 31 (46), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Unlike iconic and indexical modes of reference, which form the bases for all representation in the living world, symbolic”
Page 32 (47), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “reference is, on this planet at least, a form of representation that is unique to humans. Symbols refer, not simply through the similarity of icons, or solely through the pointing of indices. Rather, as with the word causanguichu, they refer to their object indirectly by virtue of the ways in which they relate systemically to other such symbols.”
Page 32 (47), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Unlike icons, which represent by virtue of the resemblances they share with objects, indices represent “by virtue of real connections to them” (Peirce 1998c: 461; see also CP 2.248).”
Page 33 (48), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Indices provide informa- tion about such absent futures. Th ey encourage us to make a connection between what is happening and what might potentially happen.”
Page 33 (48), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “living signs”
Page 33 (48), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “signs are alive. A crashing palm tree—taken as sign—is alive insofar as it can grow. It is alive insofar as it will come to be interpreted bya subsequent sign in a semiotic chain that extends into the possible future. ”
Page 34 (49), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Signs don’t come from the mind. Rather, it is the other way around. What we call mind, or self, is a product of semiosis. Th at “somebody,” human or non-human, who takes the crashing palm to be signifi cant is a “self that is just com-ing into life in the fl ow of time” (CP 5.421) by virtue of the ways in which she comes to be a locus—however ephemeral—for the “interpretance” of this signand many others like it.”
Page 34 (49), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 34 (49), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In fact, Peirce coined the cumbersome term interpre-tant to avoid the “homunculus fallacy” (see Deacon 2012: 48) of seeing a self as a sort of black box (a little person inside us, a homunculus) who would be the interpreter of those signs but not herself the product of those signs. Selves, human or nonhuman, simple or complex, are outcomes of semiosis as well as the starting points for new sign interpretation whose outcome will be a future self. Th ey are waypoints in a semiotic process. ”
Page 35 (50), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “absences”
Page 35 (50), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “A glass fl ask is as much about what it is as it is about what it is not; it is as much about the vessel blown into form by the glassmaker—and all the material qualities and technological, political, and socioeconomic histories that made that act of creation possible—as it is about the specifi c geometry of absence that it comes to delimit. Certain kinds of reactions can take place in that fl ask because of all the others that are excluded from it.”
Page 38 (53), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “My call to provincialize language alludes to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provin- cializing Europe (2000), To provincialize Europe is to recognize that such theory (with its assumptions about progress, time, etc.) is situated in the particular European context of its production”
Page 39 (54), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We need to provincialize language because we confl ate representation with language and this confl ation fi nds its way into our theory. We universalize this distinctive human propensity by fi rst assuming that all representation is some-thing human and then by supposing that all representation has languagelikeproperties.”
Page 39 (54), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 39 (54), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Symbolic representation, manifested most clearly in lan- guage, is conventional, “arbitrary,” and embedded in a system of other such symbols, which, in turn, is sustained in social, cultural, and political contexts that have similar systemic and conventional properties.”
Page 40 (55), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is confl ation of representation with language—the assumption that all representational phenomena have symbolic properties—holds even for those kinds of projects that are explicitly critical of cultural, symbolic, or linguistic approaches.”
Page 41 (56), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “We need, in Viveiros de Castro’s words, to “decolonize thought,” in order to see that thinking is not necessarily circumscribed by language, the symbolic, or the human.”
Page 42 (57), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “To summarize: signs are not exclusively human aff airs. All living beings sign. We humans are therefore at home with the multitude of semiotic life. Our exceptional status is not the walled compound we thought we once inhabited. An anthropology that focuses on the relations we humans have with nonhuman beings forces us to step beyond the human. In the process it makes what we’ve taken to be the human condition—namely, the paradoxical, and “provincialized,” fact that our nature is to live immersed in the “unnatural” worlds we construct—appear a little strange. Learning how to appreciate this is an important goal of an anthropology beyond the human. ”
Page 42 (57), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 221 (236), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Beyond”
Page 221 (236), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Why ask anthropology to look beyond the human? And why look to ani- mals to do so? Looking at animals, who look back at us, and who look with us, and who are also, ultimately, part of us, even though their lives extend well beyond us, can tell us something. lineage of Lion to which it also contributes. And this reality lies beyond a related one that it sustains: when we speak the word lion it contributes to, at the same time that it draws on, a general concept—Lion—to invoke a living lion. So, beyond the uttered “lion” (technically a “token”) lies the concept (the “type”) Lion; and beyond that concept lies a living lion; and beyond any such individual lion lies a kind (or species or lineage)—a Lion—that both emerges from and sustains the many lives of these many lions.”
Page 222 (237), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th at Sphinx beckons us to think with images. And this, ultimately, is what How Forests Th ink is about: learning to think with images. Th e Sphinx’s ques-tion is an image, a likeness of its answer, one that is thus a kind of icon. Th e riddle is like a mathematical equation. Consider something as simple as 2 + 2 + 2 = 6. Because the terms on either side of the equals sign are iconic of each other, learning to see “six” as three “twos” tells us something new about the number 6 (see Peirce CP 2.274–302). ”
Page 222 (237), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “inking with images, as I do here with the Sphinx’s riddle, and as I do throughout this book, with all kinds of images—be they oneiric, aural, anec- dotal, mythic, or even photographic (there are other stories being “told” here without words)—and learning to attend to the ways in which these images amplify, and thus render apparent, something about the human via that which lies beyond the human, is, as I’ve been arguing, also a way of opening ourselves to the distinctive iconic logics of how the forest’s thoughts might think their ways through us. How Forests Th ink aims to think like forests: in images.”
Page 222 (237), Stamp (Star (Frame, Red))
Page 223 (238), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Chapter 1, “Th e Open Whole,” charted an approach for doing so by fi nding a way to recognize semiosis as something that extends beyond the symbolic (that distinctively human semiotic modality that makes language, culture, and society, as we know them, possible).”
Page 223 (238), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “inking in twos, is ingrained in what it means to be human, and moving beyond this kind of handedness requires a real feat of defamiliarizing”
Page 224 (239), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “the human. Th at is, it requires us to undertake an arduous process of decolo-nizing our thinking. It asks us to “provincialize” language in order to make room for another kind of thought—a kind of thought that is more capacious, one that holds and sustains the human. ”
Page 224 (239), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Th is other kind of thinking is the one that forests do, the kind of thinking that thinks its way through the lives of people, like the Runa (and others), who engage intimately with the forest’s liv- ing beings in ways that amplify life’s distinctive logics.”
Page 224 (239), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Chapter 2, “Th e Living Th ought,” sought to unpack the claim that lives, and hence forests, think. Th at is, it looked to forms of representation—forms of thought—beyond language, with specifi c attention to the domain beyond the human in which these exist.”
Page 224 (239), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “at nonhuman living beings are constitutively semiotic makes them selves. Th ese nonhuman selves think, and their thinking is a form of association that also creates relations among selves.”
Page 224 (239), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In chapter 3, “Soul Blindness,” I began to observe how the death beyond life is also central to life. My focus here was on how death becomes a problem—a “diffi culty of reality”—intrinsic tolife, and how the Runa struggle to fi nd ways to come to terms with this. ”
Page 224 (239), Highlight (Cyan): Content: ““Trans-Species Pidgins” is a pivotal chapter. Having ventured beyond the human, and without losing sight of what that off ers, I steered this anthropol-ogy back to the “all too human”—clarifying why this approach that I advocate is an anthropological approach, and not, say, an ecological one that agnostically charts multispecies relations. In the Runa’s journeys beyond the human, in their struggles to communicate with those animals and spirits that “people” ”
Page 225 (240), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “that vast ecology of selves that extends beyond them, they don’t want to stop being human.”
Page 225 (240), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Central to our distinctive ways of being human (which result from our pro- pensity to think through symbols) is that we humans, as opposed to other kinds of living beings, are moral creatures. Put simply, we cannot aff ord to ignore this all-too-human realm as we move beyond the human.”
Page 225 (240), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “In its attempt to relate the all too human to that which lies beyond the human, “Trans-Species Pidgins” also reveals something about the concept “beyond” as an analytic. “Beyond,” as I deploy it, exceeds, at the same time that it is continuous with, its subject matter; an anthropology beyond the human is still about the human, even though and precisely because it looks to that which lies beyond it—a “beyond” that also sustains the human.”
Page 225 (240), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “chapter 5, “Form’s Eff ortless Effi cacy,” sought to move beyond the realm of life to the strange workings of form that sustain both human and nonhuman life. It argued that form is its own kind of real, one that emerges in the world and is amplifi ed thanks to the distinctive manner in which humans and nonhumans harness it.”
Page 225 (240), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “Chapter 6, “Th e Living Future (and the Imponderable Weight of the Dead),” turned to the afterlife of the spirit realm that lies beyond the realm of the living. Its primary task was to understand how this realm says something about the way life itself continues beyond the living bodies that breathe that life. Th is chapter, then, is, one might say, about the reality of Lion as both kind and type. Lion as “kind” (or species, or lineage) is the prod-uct of life broadly construed, whereas Lion as “type” is the product of a human ”
Page 226 (241), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “symbolic form of life.”
Page 226 (241), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “roughout this book I have sought ways to account for diff erence and novelty despite continuity. Emergence is a technical term I used to trace link- ages across disjuncture; beyond is a broader, more general, one.”
Page 226 (241), Highlight (Yellow): Content: “Emergence beyond”
Page 227 (242), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I’m not, as should by now be clear, talking about culture.”
Page 227 (242), Highlight (Cyan): Content: “I am not doing salvage anthropology. For what I am charting does not just disappear; ethnographic attention to this particular set of relations amplifi es and thus allows us to appre-ciate ways of attending to the living logics that are already part of how forests think themselves through “us.” And if “we” are to survive the Anthropocene—this indeterminate epoch of ours in which the world beyond the human is being increasingly made over by the all-too-human—we will have to actively cultivatethese ways of thinking with and like forests.”
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